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Shame proneness is associated with psychopathology and may serve as a risk factor for 
experiencing distressing emotions at subclinical and clinical levels across diagnoses. 
Additionally, shame-prone individuals may have increased sensitivity toward interpersonal 
stressors and negative shifts in self-evaluations. However, little to no research has examined 
shame proneness as a prospective risk factor for distressed moods following interpersonal 
stressors using experience sampling methods. Furthermore, disagreement on theories of shame 
make it difficult to achieve consistent results in the literature. The purpose of this study was to 
assess whether shame proneness acts as a risk factor for distressed moods in the context of 
interpersonal stressors. Participants included 152 (76% female) undergraduate students (Mage = 
19.51, SD = 2.09) varying across clinical and non-clinical levels of anxiety and mood disorders. 
Participants completed baseline measures of shame- and guilt-proneness followed by ratings of 
stressful interactions for five weeks, three times a week. Participants rated the degree to which 
the stressful event involved the other individual’s negative evaluation, and the degree to which 
the participants viewed themselves as having agency (i.e., status, social standing) and 
communion (i.e., social connection) as a result of the interaction. Participants also rated 
concurrent depressed, anxious, and angry moods at the time of the interaction. Multilevel 
modeling was used to test the effects of shame proneness (controlling for guilt proneness) on 
daily distressed moods and moderations with the above person-mean centered interpersonal 
stressors. Results showed that grand-mean centered shame proneness prospectively predicted 
depressed and anxious but not angry moods across stressor contexts (b = 0.02, 95CI = [0.01, 
0.04]; b = 0.02, 95CI = [0.01, 0.04]; and b = 0.02, 95CI = [-0.01, 0.03], respectively). Only 
perceived negative evaluation interacted with shame proneness when predicting angry mood (b = 
   
0.0001, 95CI = [0.0001, 0.0005]), such that individuals higher in shame proneness experienced 
even more angry mood following these stressors relative to less shame-prone peers. Shame 
proneness did not interact with perceived submission or disconnectedness when predicting 





Introduction and Literature Review 
In the last two decades, researchers have begun to shed light on a distinct set of social 
emotions emphasizing self-conscious processes such as reflection on one’s own interpersonal 
behavior and its impact on others (see Tracy & Robins, 2004). These include emotions such as 
shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (Tangney et al., 2007). Shame and guilt are of particular 
interest due to their relevance to interpersonal functioning and emotional well-being (Tangney et 
al., 2007). Despite ongoing questions about how shame and guilt should best be defined and 
measured (Cohen et al., 2011), shame proneness in particular has consistently and uniquely 
predicted psychopathology (Cândea & Szentagotai-Tătar, 2013; Dearing et al., 2005; Hastings et 
al., 2002; Hawes et al., 2013; Rüsch et al., 2007). For example, shame proneness predicted 
psychopathology beyond depressive thinking (Mills et al., 2013) or SES (Stuewig et al., 2014). 
Tangney’s self-behavior distinction between shame proneness and guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002) has emerged as the predominant theory on shame and how it may promote 
psychopathology. This theory conceptualizes shame proneness as the tendency to appraise the 
self (rather than behavior) negatively in response to one’s perceived transgression, whether real 
or imagined (Tangney, 1990; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). According to the self-behavior 
distinction, whereas shame involves perceiving one’s entire self or person negatively and fosters 
avoidance or withdrawal behavior, guilt proneness is conceptualized as more adaptive in that it 
involves appraising only the behavior negatively, which can motivate reparative behavior (e.g., 
apologizing). Therefore, shame proneness is particularly clinically relevant and important to 
study.  
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Shame proneness may be a risk factor for distressing negative emotions across diagnoses. 
Consistent with the dimensional view of symptoms (Bullis et al., 2019; Brown & Barlow, 2009; 
Widiger, 1992; Widiger & Gore, 2014), negative emotions experienced in daily life may occur 
on a spectrum with more significant symptomatology. Because shame proneness is associated 
with psychopathology, which often involves frequent and intense experience of negative 
emotions in everyday life, shame proneness may be a risk factor for experiencing higher daily 
distress, even at subclinical levels. However, despite its widespread associations with 
psychopathology in cross-sectional research, to my knowledge, only one study has examined 
shame proneness (vs. state measures) as a predictor of daily emotion in daily life using 
experience sampling methods. Specifically, Luoma et al. (2018) used the internalized shame 
scale at baseline and daily mood fluctuations to predict drinking behavior. However, more 
research is needed to predict risk for psychopathology broadly. Therefore, this study first seeks 
to examine whether shame proneness prospectively predicts daily distressed emotions (anxiety, 
depression, anger) using experience sampling methods.  
In addition, shame proneness may place individuals at increased risk for distress not just 
in general, but in the context of situational stressors and social situations that might elicit 
fluctuations in self-perceptions. Psychopathology is frequently associated with impaired social 
functioning (Keltner & Kring, 1999), and researchers are beginning to assess the differential 
impact of interpersonal processes on negative emotions. As a social emotion, shame-prone 
individuals may have increased sensitivity to interpersonal stressors compared to non-
interpersonal ones. However, research has not examined the interaction between shame 
proneness and interpersonal stressors in predicting distressed mood in daily life, despite the fact 
that experience sampling methods are especially useful for measuring mood following particular 
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social interactions (Moskowitz & Young, 2006). This paper uses experiential sampling methods 
to examine whether individuals higher in shame proneness are particularly sensitive to the effects 
of negative evaluation (interpersonal stressor) on daily depressed, anxious, and angry mood. 
However, given the conceptualization of shame as a self-conscious social emotion, it is 
important to consider not just the situational stressor (e.g., social evaluative threat) that is 
important to examine in predicting distressed mood, but also the individual’s resulting self-
evaluation based on the outcome of the interaction (in other words, how the target individual 
views him- or herself following the interpersonal stressor). Recent integrative theoretical 
advancements in conceptualizing shame suggest that it may be uniquely sensitive to perceived 
fluctuations in one’s standing on a vertical dimension of social hierarchy, whereas guilt may be 
sensitive to shifts on a horizontal dimension of reciprocity or connection with others (Giner-
Sorolla, 2013). Thus, shame-prone individuals may be particularly vulnerable to negative 
emotions when experiencing downwards shifts in hierarchical status or dominance, as compared 
to shifts in social connection. However, this theory warrants direct empirical testing of these 
ideas, an aim of the present study.  
 The purpose of this study is threefold: (1) to examine shame proneness as a risk factor for 
higher average daily distress states of depression, anxiety, and anger, (2) to test whether shame-
prone individuals are particularly at risk for negative moods in the context of the interpersonal 
stressor of negative social evaluation, and (3) to test whether shame proneness will interact with 
situational shifts on the vertical and horizontal social dimensions. Before describing the present 
study, I will review the literature on the theories of shame, links of shame to psychopathology 
and relevance to dimensional symptoms, and reasons to expect shame proneness to interact with 
effects of interpersonal stressors on distress, in particular.  
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Shame Proneness 
Theories on Shame 
Several theories of shame have been developed, emphasizing different factors that 
differentiate shame from guilt. These include self versus behavior, public versus private, and 
hierarchical versus reciprocal distinctions (Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Noting limitations with each 
theory, Giner-Sorolla (2013) presented a fourth, integrative view. Each is presented below.  
Self-Behavior  
First, the self-behavior (or act-person) view refers to the behavior (act) versus self 
(person) distinction in its negative appraisal and action tendency. Otherwise known as the self-
behavior distinction, this theory and its associated measure (the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 
[TOSCA-3]; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2000) represents the predominant 
approach to studying shame. Originally suggested by Lewis (1971), the self-behavior view holds 
that shame proneness is the tendency to view and experience one’s core self, or entire person, as 
inherently flawed, bad, defective, or unworthy (Tangney, 1996; Tangney et al., 1992b). The 
attentional focus is on the self being bad, rather than the behavior associated with the social or 
moral transgressions. On the other hand, Tangney et al. (2007) defined guilt as the emotion 
resulting from believing that one has committed a wrongful behavior or act.  
This theory describes shame and guilt in terms of distinct cognitive styles. Shame derives 
from internal, stable, and global attributions (Tangney et al., 1992b). In other words, causes or 
consequences of negative events are attributed to an internal (vs. external) sense of blame, are 
presumed to be relatively unchangeable and consistent (stable), and involve an evaluation of the 
entire self (global). This encapsulates a characterological self-blame described by Tangney et al. 
(1992b) that mirrors the attributional pattern found in depression, for example. On the other 
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hand, guilt results from cognitive attributions that are unstable and specific, although still 
internal (Tracy & Robins, 2006; Vliet, 2009). This means that although the negative event is still 
viewed as internally-caused (versus having external, environmental causation), the event is 
attributed to the specific behavior, which is interpreted as relatively changeable and manageable 
due to its specific and unstable nature. In other words, the more stable and global a cause is 
perceived to be, the more hopeless the individual may be about his ability to change it. To 
illustrate, a shame-prone individual may attribute a moral failure to the self via thoughts such as, 
“I’m stupid and unworthy,” while a guilt-prone individual might think, “I fell short this time, but 
will try harder next time.” Incidentally, this pattern is often seen in the low self-efficacy and 
learned helplessness seen in depression (Bandura et al., 1999; Feiring et al., 2002; Miller & 
Seligman, 1975). Research supports evidence for internal attributions in guilt and shame, and 
stable/global attributions for shame proneness but not guilt (Pineles et al., 2006). 
In addition to distinct cognitive processes, shame and guilt pull for different associated 
action tendencies (emotion-driven behaviors). Tangney’s model suggests that shame results in 
the behavioral tendency to hide, withdraw, or in some cases attack (Tangney, 1996; Tangney et 
al., 1992b). Contrasting its natural withdrawal/avoidance behavior, anger and aggression may 
reflect an unexpected or “second face” of shame, when shame is so unbearable that individuals 
lash out to defend the social self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1992a). As such, 
with the self-behavior view, shame may be associated with either withdrawal/avoidance or 
hostility/aggression. Guilt, on the other hand, is theorized to be associated more frequently with 
motivating apology or repair for the wrongdoing, and therefore promoting prosocial or adaptive 
responses (Tangney, 1996; Tangney et al., 1992b). A recent meta-analysis showed negative 
associations with prosocial behavior for shame proneness but positive for guilt proneness, 
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although the association with guilt was moderated by measure type (Tignor & Colvin, 2017). 
Specifically, the positive association with guilt was found for scenario measures (e.g., TOSCA-
3) but was nonsignificant for checklist item measures. The present study incorporated the most 
widely-used measure of shame and guilt proneness (TOSCA) founded on the self-behavior view, 
although it is not the only way to conceptualize these constructs.  
However, this theory is not without limitations. Although avoidance/withdrawal or 
externalization has the function of defending the self (Gausel & Leach, 2011), thereby being 
adaptive in some way, some argue that shame may have approach-oriented, prosocial qualities to 
it. These include apology/repair and self-improvement (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Gausel et al., 
2018; Gausel et al., 2016; Leach, 2017; Leach & Cidam, 2015), behaviors not captured by the 
primary measure derived from the self-behavior theory (i.e., TOSCA-3; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002; Tangney et al., 2000). This prosocial response resulted from appraising failure or social 
image as reparable in a meta-analysis, motivating the individual toward self-improvement or 
repair (Leach & Cidam, 2015). These constructive responses may also occur under 
circumstances where the individual is motivated to protect self-image (Gausel & Leach, 2011). 
Failures for which the individual does not feel a sense of control may result in avoidance. 
Additionally, others argue that shame is experienced too frequently for it to be entirely 
pathological (Giner-Sorolla, 2013), again suggesting an adaptive quality to it, contrary to the 
implications of the self-behavior theory.  
Public-Private  
A second theory of shame distinguishes shame and guilt based on hypothesized external 
(public) or internal (private) moral standards, respectively (Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). Here, guilt is proposed as an emotion resulting from a behavioral violation of an 
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internalized set of values or moral code valued by the individual. In contrast, shame in this 
theory results from an “external moral conscience,” in that the individual feels uncomfortable 
about the possibility of social disapproval by others. In other words, the concern is not on having 
done a bad behavior, but on the social appearance of the act and its social consequences. 
However, some have criticized the public-private distinction due to the fact that individuals may 
experience shame in even private settings (e.g., imagining a shameful experience; Smith et al., 
2002), implying that internalized moral standards (or standards that are incorporated into one’s 
identity or character) may be characteristic of shame as well. Furthermore, research has not 
supported this view (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). The present study’s aims do not directly 
address the public-private distinction. 
Hierarchical-Reciprocal  
A third theory of shame and guilt emphasizes a distinction between hierarchical and 
reciprocal social relations, grounded upon an evolutionary perspective (Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 
2007; Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Guilt is thought to monitor the self in relation to peers in a reciprocal 
relationship (horizontal), whereas shame monitors and adjusts the self’s position relative to a 
social hierarchy (vertical). According to this view, shame may not necessarily provide direct, 
immediate benefit to the individual, but instead promotes social coherence and harmony for the 
larger group. In this sense, shame is adaptive not in terms of individual happiness but for survival 
and group inclusion, consistent with the biological evolutionary perspective (Fessler, 2007). 
Shame may maintain homeostatic balance, in that hierarchies decrease conflict and enhance 
organization. For example, in the animal kingdom, acknowledging another primate’s dominance 
prevents continual battles for power; similarly, humans’ submission to authority in the workplace 
and society maintains order and efficiency in system operations and organizational structures 
  8 
 
(Giner-Sorolla, 2013). More indirectly, the expression of shame can pacify further punishment 
from group members, as the members see that the shameful individual acknowledges his or her 
lower social standing in the hierarchical system and has suffered already. Giner-Sorolla (2013) 
points out that although Western society tends to shun hierarchical systems today, rank-ordering 
is still present in more socially acceptable ways, such as evaluation of individuals’ competence 
(e.g., productivity, intelligence) or the degree to which someone is moral or ethical. The fact that 
shame, according to this theory, can result from both moral and non-moral situations implies that 
shame is not necessarily a moral emotion, contrary to the self-behavior view, giving credence for 
a social hierarchy that can place individuals higher or lower based on any value system (e.g., 
intelligence). Additionally, simply internalizing one’s hierarchical placement and its resulting 
worth is sufficient to produce feelings of shame in this view; others are not required to be present 
to induce shame. Giner-Sorolla (2013) summarized the hierarchical-reciprocal view by asserting 
that shame maintains inequalities (i.e., preserves the hierarchical system) while guilt reduces 
inequalities (i.e., making amends between individuals to restore relations). Therefore, shame’s 
prosocial behavior is theorized to regulate and maintain the social hierarchy. 
De Hooge’s (2014) sociometer theory implies vertical and horizontal components to both 
shame and guilt and poses the idea that shame can even motivate prosocial, approach-oriented 
behavior. In this model, shame signals to the individual his potential for social exclusion or 
rejection via a social barometer. When one’s social barometer signals that the social self is 
damaged or threatened, such as violating a group standard or norm, feelings of shame result and 
motivate one toward affiliative (horizontal) or appeasement (low vertical) behaviors in ways that 
minimize the likelihood of rejection, subsequently restoring one’s status in the social group. 
Shame, in this theory, holds two functions. First, behavioral manifestations of shame (e.g., 
  9 
 
slumped posture, averted gaze; Gilbert, 1997; Keltner & Buswell, 1996) communicate 
nonverbally that the individual is cognizant of his wrongdoing and will behave differently next 
time. From an evolutionary perspective, these nonverbal, submissive expressions in primates 
communicate an understanding of lower social rank or status, signaling that aggression will not 
ensue (Kemeny et al., 2004). Second, the individual may actively engage in affiliative, prosocial 
behavior (e.g., cooperation; gift-giving) to reduce the likelihood of exclusion and to repair the 
damaged social self. The social self is one’s self-evaluation of social standing in terms of 
potential or existing social relationships (de Hooge, 2014). Therefore, the sociometer theory 
proposes adaptive aspects to shame in terms of group and societal functioning (e.g., motivating 
prosocial behavior), and implies both vertical and horizontal dimensions to shame.  
In contrast, this theory posits guilt functioning solely on the horizontal dimension. De 
Hooge (2014) stated that guilt results from neglecting or violating relational expectations, 
commitments, or obligations. This emotion, involving remorse and regret for one’s behavior 
against another individual, is associated with prosocial behavior towards the victim, such as 
apology and damage reparation. Although it may seem that the approach-oriented behavior in 
shame is that of guilt’s horizontal axis, de Hooge clarifies that shame’s behaviors are directed 
towards a group of people, whereas guilt’s are towards one victim. However, the hierarchical-
reciprocal view does not explain why one situation can lead to either experiencing shame or guilt 
and the resultant divergent behavioral outcomes. Giner-Sorolla (2013) resolves discrepancies 
between the three theories by integrating them into a new view of shame and guilt, presented 
next. The present study speaks to the possible hierarchical and reciprocal components of shame 
proneness by using measures capturing the vertical and horizontal aspects of interpersonal or 
social dimensions, described below.  
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Integrative View  
Noting limitations with each of the three stand-alone theories in their abilities to fully 
explain shame, guilt, and their associated action tendencies (see Giner-Sorolla, 2013), Giner-
Sorolla presented a fourth view synthesizing the central principles of all three theories. The basic 
premise of his theory is that shame results from perceived hierarchical relationships whereas 
guilt results from perceived reciprocal relationships, with two types of shame and guilt: 
unworthiness shame and defensive shame, and inequality guilt and injustice guilt.  
First, operating along a vertical dimension, unworthiness shame is the shame response 
that occurs when an individual who accepts his low social worth or standing is given a higher 
position than he deserves (for example, a criminal who is asked to dine at the king’s table and, 
recognizing his depravity, feels shame). Or, in the Christian scriptures, after Jesus performs a 
miracle for the fisherman Peter, Peter realizes he is in the presence of a holy God, recognizes his 
unworthiness, and falls at Jesus’ feet, crying, “Depart from me, for I am a sinful man…” (Luke 
5:1-9 English Standard Version). Unworthiness shame’s global self-evaluation and its associated 
avoidant behavior is conceptualized as the kind described by the self-behavior distinction, and it 
may be socially adaptive if the moral judgment is grounded in social reality. For instance, a child 
psychologist convicted of soliciting sex from a minor who in court slumps his posture, lowers his 
head, and accepts a guilty verdict for a prison sentence communicates to society that he agrees 
with the public’s judgment of moral inferiority, functioning to assuage further uproar. Therefore, 
unworthiness shame includes an acceptance of low social standing along the social hierarchy, 
resulting in avoidance and submission. This kind of response is adaptive if there is reality in the 
individual’s low rank.   
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Also operating along a hierarchical dimension, the second type of shame is defensive. 
Unlike unworthiness shame, in which the individual adjusts behavior to live consistent with the 
low rank, defensive shame is characterized by the desire to regain social standing if lost or 
defend it if threatened. Importantly, this response is different from the one produced from anger 
as a primary emotional response, in which the individual disagrees with the loss in social rank; 
defensive shame agrees with the verdict and seeks to regain status (e.g., the shamed criminal who 
changes his behavior to regain self-pride, or the cowardly soldier who fights valiantly in order to 
redeem himself and regain honor for his family). Instead, Giner-Sorolla (2013) states that anger 
and hatred include other-centered blame, rather than self-blame as happens with shame/guilt, 
although defensive shame may lead to the other-centered blame that results in anger. This may 
explain the frequent co-occurrence of shame and anger/hostility (Bennett et al., 2005; Harper & 
Arias, 2004; Lewis, 1971; Paulhus et al., 2004; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). 
Therefore, defensive shame accepts the public’s verdict of falling social worth but seeks to 
restore it.  
While shame maintains global attributions of self-worth and operates under a social 
hierarchical system, guilt is more attentive to preserving and restoring the social relationship 
(horizontal) and is more consistently associated with reparative actions (e.g., apology). Given its 
lesser focus on the self compared to shame, and its desire for re-establishing equality, Giner-
Sorolla considers guilt as the inherently more moral emotion. Under the integrative view, he 
describes guilt as originating from three appraisals: inequality, responsibility, and injustice (or 
lack of justification), with the former being classified under “inequality guilt” and the latter two 
under “injustice guilt.” First, inequality guilt may result from observing, and may subsequently 
involve leveling, inequality (e.g., restoring close relations) in a social, peer relationship where an 
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individual is wronged. For example, Giner-Sorolla (2013) illustrated that guilt may be 
experienced when realizing that one holds privilege or when feeling survivor’s guilt. In this case, 
even mild guilt can be present even if the other two appraisals (i.e., responsibility and injustice) 
are absent. However, this form of guilt may not be sufficient to result in a functional society that 
will lead to reparative action under inequality guilt alone. Therefore, he adds that optimal 
conditions under which guilt is felt and more likely leads to productive, corrective action are the 
additional presence of injustice guilt. Building upon inequality guilt, injustice guilt adds two 
additional components to the perceived inequality: First, the individual views the inequality as 
unjustified, and second, the individual takes responsibility for the inequality. Missing these two 
components lessens the likelihood of experiencing guilt and the subsequent reparative action. 
First, perceiving an inequality as justified lessens the experience of guilt. For example, 
inequalities in resources may be perceived as justified or fair if the disadvantaged ‘other’ is less 
skilled or qualified, does not work as hard, or is less moral. Second, perceiving oneself as not 
responsible for an inequality can also lessen the likelihood of felt guilt, thereby conserving 
resources for limited and specific relationships. For example, guilt for being privileged may not 
be felt if the individual does not feel responsible for the inequality or feels the inequality is 
justified. Taken together, an example where all three guilt appraisals are met is if a spouse feels 
responsible for disappointing his wife due to missing an important event for which he promised 
attendance. Because he views himself as having treated his spouse unfairly (i.e., inequality guilt), 
considers it to be unjustified by any fault of hers, and takes responsibility for this transgression 
(i.e., injustice guilt), he may adjust his behavior and pay closer attention to activities that would 
restore the ruptured relationship, such as apologizing and tracking timeliness. Therefore, 
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according to the integrative view, injustice guilt builds upon inequality guilt by including all 
three appraisals for inequality, injustice, and responsibility.  
In summary, theoretical development and refinement for shame remains ongoing. 
Researchers have emphasized the self-behavior, public-private, and hierarchical-reciprocal 
distinctions between shame and guilt, with an integrative view incorporating aspects from all 
three theories to reconcile discrepancies or inadequacies posed by stand-alone theories. With 
shame research still being in its early stages, most psychopathology literature is principally 
grounded upon the self-behavior distinction due to its use of the TOSCA-3 shame measure which 
has shown consistent associations with psychopathology. Nonetheless, awareness of the 
integrative theory of shame may generate testable hypotheses even with the TOSCA-3. For 
example, the hierarchical-reciprocal distinction may inform predictions about how shame-prone 
individuals may be particularly at risk for distress in the contexts of perceived situational shifts 
on the vertical dominance and horizontal communal dimensions. Though the present study does 
not focus on guilt proneness as conceptualized under the integrative view, it indirectly examines 
relationships between shame proneness and sensitivity to movement along the vertical 
dimension, movement which is captured under self-view following interpersonal interactions, 
with resulting sensitivity measured by distressed moods.  
Evidence for Links of Shame Proneness to Psychopathology and Negative Emotions 
TOSCA Shame Proneness  
Relevant to the background and method of this paper, as previously mentioned, the 
predominant view on shame proneness in psychopathology literature is the self-behavior 
distinction. As one of the pioneers in shame and guilt research, Tangney and colleagues 
developed a measure of shame and guilt proneness reflecting the self-behavior distinction, the 
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TOSCA-3 (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2000). This measure of shame proneness 
gained traction in clinical psychology literature after producing consistent evidence for 
associations with psychopathology (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992b). As a result, because researchers 
most frequently used the TOSCA as their method of measurement, and due to its consistent 
associations with psychopathology, the literature now consists primarily of findings based on the 
self-behavior view, supporting the perspective that shame proneness, as measured by the 
TOSCA-3, is generally maladaptive, whereas guilt proneness is not. Representative studies are 
reviewed below. 
Shame Proneness and Psychopathology 
As reported above, due to it being the predominant theory on shame and guilt in 
psychopathology literature, research based on the self-behavior view (i.e., using the TOSCA) has 
consistently evidenced associations between shame proneness and psychopathology. Despite the 
fact that recent theories of shame have begun to speculate about adaptive functions of shame, the 
view of shame proneness measured by the TOSCA has emphasized maladaptive features, and 
empirical research has linked shame proneness broadly with psychopathology (Tangney et al., 
1992b). For example, shame proneness correlated with features of OCD (Wetterneck et al., 
2014), social anxiety, and generalized anxiety symptoms (Fergus et al., 2010), with the latter two 
even after accounting for shared variance in cognitive distortions (e.g., global, negative self-
evaluations; Cândea & Szentagotai-Tătar, 2014). Trait shame also correlated with depression 
(Cândea & Szentagotai-Tătar, 2018; Hastings et al., 2002; Highfield et al., 2010; Kim et al., 
2011), eating disorders (Cesare et al., 2016), substance use (Dearing et al., 2005), and suicidal 
ideation or behavior (Hastings, et al., 2002). It may also mediate the relationship between 
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parental invalidation and functions of nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) in children and adolescents 
(Mahtani et al., 2018).  
Shame proneness has also been associated with personality disorders which are 
characterized by difficulties in interpersonal contexts, such as narcissistic personality disorder 
(NPD; Ritter et al., 2014) and Cluster C personality disorder symptoms, even after controlling 
for negative affect (Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2010). Borderline personality disorder (BPD) 
has shown strong links to shame proneness as well. For example, although a social anxiety group 
endorsed higher shame proneness than controls, the BPD group endorsed the highest levels 
(Rüsch et al., 2007). Similar patterns were found for individuals with BPD compared to NPD and 
healthy controls (Ritter et al., 2014). Additionally, suicide attempters with BPD endorsed higher 
shame proneness than suicide attempters without BPD, non-suicidal psychiatric patients (the 
majority consisting of depression, anxiety, and personality disorders), and healthy controls 
(Wiklander et al., 2012). Thus, shame-proneness has been linked to a variety of clinical 
disorders, although this research has been limited mostly to cross-sectional studies.  
Negative Emotions as Dimensional Risk Factors 
However, shame proneness is relevant not only to individuals meeting formal criteria for 
specific diagnoses. Shame proneness may constitute a transdiagnostic risk factor for 
psychopathology due to its links with many disorders, in line with the view that symptom 
dimensions often cut across discrete DSM categories (Bullis et al., 2019). Despite the utility of 
clinical diagnoses, contemporary psychopathology research has emphasized the dimensional 
nature of symptoms, suggesting a broad continuum between subclinical and clinical levels 
(Brown & Barlow, 2009; Widiger, 1992; Widiger & Gore, 2014). Consistent with this view, trait 
shame may be considered another vulnerability factor for experiencing negative emotions more 
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frequently in daily life, which may explain why it is associated with psychopathology in the 
literature. The propensity to experience shame is relevant to subclinical negative emotions that, 
when prolonged, can lead to clinical symptoms. Shame proneness is therefore likely to predict 
dimensional levels of a range of negative symptoms, and three negative emotions may be 
particularly relevant to individuals with high shame proneness: depression, anxiety, and anger.  
Depressed Mood  
First, shame proneness may predict depressed moods. A meta-analysis produced evidence 
for a strong link between shame and depressive symptoms as common comorbid emotions (Kim 
et al., 2011). Both involve the threat of social rejection and thwarted belongingness, increased 
rumination (e.g., negative self-evaluation), and maladaptive attributional patterns (i.e., stable, 
global, uncontrollable), making sense of links to depressed mood. Supporting this claim, for 
instance, shame proneness mediated the relationship between resilience and depressed mood (Uji 
et al., 2011). In line with the view of shame as a social emotion, chronically low social status 
predicted depressed and anxious mood, lower well-being, and physiological consequences, such 
as the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) cortisol stress response and inflammation 
(Gruenewald et al., 2007). In a clinical sample of individuals with major depressive disorder 
(MDD), viewing oneself as inadequate and with lower worth than others correlated with 
depressed mood in 90% of patients (Zahn et al., 2015). Furthermore, in non-clinical samples, 
shame strongly correlated with depression symptoms (Malinowski et al., 2017) and predicted 
children’s depression symptomatology after accounting for self-esteem and hopelessness 
(Rodriguez et al., 2019). Taken together, shame proneness may predict subsequent daily 
depressed mood. However, these studies have been limited to cross-sectional designs and have 
not examined the effects of dispositional shame (vs. state shame) on mood. Therefore, it remains 
  17 
 
to be tested whether baseline shame proneness prospectively predicts daily depressed mood in 
daily life.  
Anxious Mood 
In addition, shame proneness might serve as a risk factor for daily anxious emotions. 
Using the Experience of Shame Scale (ESS), trait shame was strongly correlated with state- and 
trait-level anxiety (Malinowski et al., 2017), and individuals experiencing greater average daily 
shame across social interactions endorsed higher subsequent generalized anxiety mood and 
symptoms (Shahar et al., 2015). However, the latter study assessed state shame using submissive 
behavior and single-item shame and inferiority endorsement, and neither study examined the 
effects of shame proneness on anxious mood beyond correlational methods. On the other hand, a 
measure of shame proneness did not predict concurrent anxiety symptoms in nonclinical children 
after accounting for self-esteem, discipline type, and depression comorbidity (Rodriguez et al., 
2019). More research is needed to test shame proneness as a risk factor for anxious mood in daily 
life. 
Angry Mood  
Third, shame proneness may place individuals at increased risk for experiencing angry 
emotions. This is consistent with Tangney’s and Dearing’s (2002) conceptualization of the 
second face of shame (i.e., anger and aggression). They, along with Lewis (1971), suggested that 
the experience of shame may be so painful and global to the self that it might lead to the 
defensive, self-regulatory or coping strategy of redirecting anger externally in order to decrease 
the threat of negative evaluation. Lewis (1971) particularly proposed this theory after observing a 
“shame-rage” cycle in clients, whose anger/hostility followed shame. Tangney et al. (2007) 
described anger as a central feature to shame and noted a reciprocal shame-rage cycle in 
  18 
 
romantic partners. Giner-Sorolla (2013) also described anger and hatred as secondary emotions 
following defensive shame. Specifically, he asserted that shame does not directly cause anger, 
but if shame’s global self-evaluation externalizes to a global other-evaluation of blame, anger or 
hatred may ensue. Therefore, individuals high in shame proneness may experience angry 
emotions more frequently and intensely. This may account for the frequent co-occurrence of 
anger in individuals with high shame proneness (e.g., BPD; Kockler et al., 2020; Scott et al., 
2015). Other research supports associations between shame proneness and anger/hostility, 
aggression, and externalized blame in both children and adults (Bennett et al., 2005; Harper & 
Arias 2004; Paulhus et al., 2004; Tangney & Dearing 2002). However, research has not 
examined the prospective effects of shame proneness on angry emotions in daily life using 
experience sampling methods. One study used similar data collection methods to explore the 
differences between shame, guilt, and embarrassment (Tangney et al., 1996). In this study, 
participants were asked to recall a situation in which they felt one of these three emotions, to 
describe the event in detail, and to rate the degree to which they felt angry at the time. Both 
shame- and guilt-inducing events were associated with feeling angry. However, the study was 
limited by its exploratory nature and lack of validated measurement of shame and guilt.  
Taken together, extant studies imply that shame proneness may place individuals at risk 
for symptoms of depression, anxiety, and anger. Nonetheless, as noted, the existing studies have 
been limited to cross-sectional designs or, if implementing daily diaries, did not assess shame 
proneness, leaving the question unanswered of whether shame-proneness constitutes a risk factor 
for downstream negative emotions in daily life contexts. The present study aims to address this 
issue as its first aim. 
Shame as Vulnerability in the Context of Interpersonal Stressors 
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Shame Proneness May Amplify Effects of Interpersonal Stress 
Beyond general proneness to negative emotions, individuals high in shame proneness 
may be particularly susceptible to experiencing negative emotions within particular stressor 
contexts. Compared to non-interpersonal stressors, interpersonal stressors are especially linked to 
distressing mood (e.g., anxiety, depression, hostility; Bolger et al., 1989). Several conceptual 
models suggest the possibility of shame proneness exacerbating this relationship. First, according 
to the diathesis-stress model (Hankin & Abela, 2005), personality diatheses or vulnerabilities 
(e.g., neuroticism) constitute a predisposing factor that interacts with environmental stressors and 
results in increased likelihood for psychopathology or distress (Tackett & Krueger, 2005). In this 
framework, shame proneness might represent a similar vulnerability to distress responses in 
particular stress contexts.  
Second, according to the Cognitive Affective Processing System (CAPS) model (Shoda 
et al., 1994), if-then behavioral signatures may be similar across individuals high in shame 
proneness regarding which interpersonal stressors more consistently produce which emotion. 
The CAPS model was developed to explain how an individual’s apparent inconsistencies in 
behavior over time actually exhibit patterned consistency. Shoda and colleagues referred to “if-
then behavioral signatures” to describe how the interaction between the situation and individual 
characteristics may more consistently produce a behavior. For instance, if an individual perceives 
others as patronizing, he or she might characteristically act aggressive. Similarly, it remains 
plausible that individuals with the dispositional tendency to feel shame may endorse higher 
negative emotions (depression, anxiety, anger) if they perceive a situation as involving shame-
relevant stressors.  
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Given shame’s status as a social emotion (e.g., de Hooge, 2014; Giner-Sorolla, 2013), it 
is likely that interpersonal stressors are particularly likely to predict negative emotions in shame-
prone individuals. For example, several studies using EMA have examined shame and anger in 
individuals with BPD, a group with high shame proneness. Greater reactivity in anger and shame 
emotions, in response to the interpersonal stressor of perceived rejection, was found in women 
with higher BPD symptoms (Scott et al., 2017). Similarly, adolescent girls with more borderline 
personality traits reported greater hostility/irritability when experiencing concurrent (state) 
shame (Scott et al., 2015). Therefore, certain types of interpersonal stressors may interact with 
shame proneness to exacerbate negative emotions, such as anger. To review, shame results from 
the threat of social rejection, exclusion, or signals of low social worth, and has been described as 
a social barometer (de Hooge, 2014). Consequently, it is worth considering what types of 
interpersonal stressors might differentially evoke distress in shame-prone individuals.  
Negative Social Evaluation as a Fundamental Social Stressor with Relevance to Negative 
Emotions  
The threat of negative social evaluation is particularly distressing for humans as social 
creatures. Characterized as a cold-dominant behavior (i.e., high dominance, low warmth), 
negative social evaluation represents a core interpersonal stressor for humans in general 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). It is associated with heightened cortisol (Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004), a stress hormone serving as a transdiagnostic biomarker for stress responses. Being 
negatively evaluated by someone implies an assessment of lower social ranking, consistent with 
an evolutionary understanding of human behavior, and has been used to explain mechanisms of 
depression (e.g., social rank theory; Gilbert, 1992; Price et al., 1994).  
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Negative evaluation is a predictor of depressed mood in general. One of the maintenance 
factors of depression is negative evaluation-seeking (Giesler et al., 1996): when expectations for 
negative evaluation are confirmed, depressed mood follows. Being negatively evaluated by 
someone with higher social status tends to pull for submissive behavior because the individual 
considers himself to be inferior in comparison (Fournier et al., 2002). Coincidentally, depression 
severity was associated with submissiveness and low sociability (McEvoy et al., 2013). 
Similarly, in interactions with depressed individuals, higher dominance of the ‘other’ predicted 
higher feelings of inferiority and higher submission (Zuroff et al., 2007). Therefore, negative 
evaluation may lead to depressed mood.  
The frequent comorbidity between depression and anxiety (Richards, 2011) implies an 
underlying transdiagnostic mechanism, with negative evaluation having similar effects on 
anxious mood as well. The fear of negative evaluation is especially central to social anxiety 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition [DSM-5]; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Social anxiety symptoms were related to negative 
emotion reactivity and higher neural activation following social threat compared to controls in an 
experimental study (Goldin et al., 2009), indicating that social threat stressors (e.g., negative 
evaluation) may be associated with anxious mood. Being ignored or rejected also implies 
negative evaluation (Geller et al., 1974), and using daily diaries, socially anxious individuals 
with GAD undergoing interpersonal rejection stressors showed higher spillover of anxious mood 
into later depressed mood (Starr & Davila, 2012). Taken together, these results suggest that 
negative evaluation stressors may predict anxious mood.  
Additionally, shame proneness may amplify depressed and anxious moods under 
negative evaluation stressors. According to the integrative theory, if shame operates according to 
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a vertical dimension, then dominant behavior that implies lower ranking, inferiority, and 
submission may compound these effects to result in even stronger depressed and anxious moods. 
Because shame involves a falling hierarchical status (Giner-Sorolla, 2013), and negative 
evaluation implies a threat to social ranking, interpersonal stressors in which an individual is 
negatively evaluated may result in stronger distressed emotions for shame-prone individuals.  
Next, interpersonal stressors characterized by negative evaluation may be associated with 
more anger in those with high shame proneness. Rejection and negative evaluation involve 
similar processes of cold-dominant behavior in which an individual is evaluated as inferior and is 
pushed away. A literature review showed associations between interpersonal rejection and 
resultant anger/aggression (Leary et al., 2006). Indeed, anger may even be an adaptive response 
to a negative evaluation of competence (Celik et al., 2016). Consistent with the social rank 
theory, criticism from individuals appraised to be of lower rank resulted in more frequent 
quarrelsome displays, although this was particularly true for individuals with a general self-view 
of inferiority (Fournier et al., 2002). This finding illustrates that shame proneness, or the 
tendency to view oneself as inferior in social status, may increase anger responses in social 
interactions. High shame proneness may explain the frequent anger/hostility reactions in BPD as 
well, a group with high shame proneness (Rüsch et al., 2007). For example, experimental 
manipulation showed increased hostility in response to a combined social rejection/negative 
evaluation stressor (but not for non-interpersonal negative evaluation stress) for high- but not 
low-BPD individuals (Chapman et al., 2015). Therefore, negatively valenced and socially 
evaluative threat may produce stronger angry emotions in highly shame-prone individuals.   
In sum, shame proneness may exacerbate the effect of negative evaluation stressors on 
predicting negative moods. Negative evaluation implies decreased approval or verdict of social 
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worth (vertical axis) along with interpersonal distancing (horizontal axis) and can result in 
depression, anxiety or anger. Shame follows a similar downward vertical process of threat for or 
actual loss in social rank. Due to this overlap, when encountering negative evaluative 
interpersonal stress, shame-prone individuals may react with stronger distressed mood compared 
to those with low shame proneness, having higher emotional lability. Therefore, shame 
proneness may interact with this stressor, leading to more frequent negative daily emotions.  
Perceived Submission and Disconnectedness May Predict Distressed Moods and Interact 
with Shame Proneness 
Submission and Disconnectedness  
Shame proneness may interact not only with social evaluation, but also with perceived 
shifts in submission and disconnectedness. In response to relevant interpersonal stressors, 
individuals may perceive themselves as either falling lower in social rank or farther away from 
community with others. In the integrative theory, shame occurs along a vertical dimension of 
social ranking, whereas guilt occurs along a horizontal dimension in response to perceived 
ruptures in closeness to others (i.e., inequality). These vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
social space resemble the two axes of social cognition that can be used to understand 
interpersonal behavior (i.e., the fundamental factors underlying the interpersonal circumplex, see 
Figure 1; Gurtman, 2009; Wiggins, 1991). The vertical dimension is labeled variously as agency, 
dominance, or power (ranging from high status and assertion through submission, passivity, or 
subordination), and the horizontal axis represents communion, affiliation, warmth, or closeness 
(Cuddy et al., 2007; Gurtman, 2009; Wiggins, 1991). Low agency (i.e., submission), is 
characterized by submission/passivity, and low communion (i.e., disconnectedness) by coldness 
or distance. The integrative theory may be understood in terms of agency and communion, in 
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that shame is felt when an individual perceives himself as lower in agency (higher submission) in 
response to an interpersonal interaction (vertical drop), and guilt is felt when an individual 
perceives himself as more disconnected (less communal) from others (horizontal distance). 
According to Giner-Sorolla’s (2013) theory, shame should only be experienced when individuals 
perceive themselves as lower in agency (y-axis) but not necessarily in communal (x-axis) 
change. This would be consistent with a hierarchical social ranking system, in which a person’s 
worth or status is determined based on vertical placement. However, other theories (e.g., 
sociometer theory; de Hooge, 2014) imply that shame operates on both a vertical and horizontal 
dimension. This is consistent with negative evaluation stressors being characterized by both 
dominance and coldness, suggesting lower status/rank (vertical) and exclusion/rejection 
(horizontal). Therefore, interpersonal stressors that result in perceptions of either lower 
rank/agency (higher submission) or decreased communality (higher disconnectedness) may 
predict negative emotions, and shame may exacerbate these effects.  
 
Figure 1. Interpersonal circumplex demonstrating vertical and horizontal dimensions of social 
space.  
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Perceived Submission (Vertical) May Predict Higher Depression/Anxiety, Lower Anger, and 
Interact with Shame Proneness  
Interpersonal interactions that result in a self-view of submission  are likely to predict 
depressed and anxious moods in general (for most people). Depression and anxiety have similar 
interpersonal flavors of passivity and submissiveness. A cold-submissive interpersonal style (i.e., 
low agency, low communion) was associated with depression, loneliness, social avoidance, trait 
anxiety (Wiggins & Broughton, 1991), and anxiety severity (McEvoy et al., 2013). Additionally, 
individuals exhibiting more submissive behavior endorsed higher average depression and anxiety 
(Rappaport et al., 2017). Therefore, interpersonal stressors leading to perceived submission 
likely predict depressed and anxious moods.  
In addition, high shame proneness may exacerbate the relation between perceived 
submission and depressed/anxious mood. Movement along the vertical axis of 
agency/submission corresponds with Giner-Sorolla’s (2013) conceptualization of shame 
reflecting a social hierarchical ranking system. In the context of social threat, viewing oneself as 
inferior and lower-ranking resulted in submission (Fournier et al., 2002). Behavioral 
manifestations of shame (e.g., avoided eye contact, slumped posture, shrinking of the self; 
Gilbert, 1997; Keltner & Buswell, 1996), are like those in submission: less verbal (Daly, 1978) 
and nonverbal communication (e.g., eye contact; Hokanson et al., 1989; Troisi & Moles, 1999), 
lower assertion (Eng & Heimbert, 2006; Grant et al., 2007), fewer interruptions (Natale et al., 
1979), and higher verbal submission (Hokanson & Butler, 1992). Social anxiety disorder was 
also uniquely associated with perceptions in low social rank, inferiority, and submission 
(Weisman et al., 2011). Therefore, individuals who are sensitive to changes in hierarchical 
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standing (i.e., shame-prone individuals) may experience more depression and anxiety when 
perceiving themselves as less agentic and more submissive.  
On the other hand, submission (i.e., low agency) may predict less anger. Said differently, 
experiencing the self as more agentic may predict more concurrent anger. Anger is characterized 
by high agency and low warmth. Other qualities associated with these axes were verbal 
aggression, quarrelsomeness, narcissism, antisocial behavior, domineeringness, authority 
conflict, cynicism, and vindictiveness (Wiggins & Broughton, 1991). When individuals interact 
with others in a way in which they strive to “come out on top,” they would be expected to 
experience the agentic emotion of anger. Importantly, consistent with the integrative theory, 
shame may not directly cause anger, but the emotion may result if the ‘other’ is blamed for the 
perceived falling social status. As the focus of emotions turns outward towards the ‘other’ rather 
than ‘self’ and dominance ensues, this may activate resources to defend hierarchical rank, 
producing anger. Shame proneness may exacerbate these effects. For example, individuals who 
generally felt inferior (shame-prone) submitted more readily to higher status figures but were 
more quarrelsome (angry) when they were in positions of higher authority, whereas those 
without self-evaluated inferiority exhibited less frequent quarrelsomeness (Fournier et al., 2002). 
This process may explain the frequent, intense anger experienced by highly shame-prone 
individuals (e.g., BPD), and is consistent with Tangney’s concept of anger/rage being the second 
face of shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Therefore, shame-prone individuals may exhibit 
higher anger, relative to their non-shame-prone peers, when they perceive themselves as being 
dominant to the ‘other’, and less angry (more submissive) when perceiving themselves as lower 
agency or rank.  
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In sum, one’s social space along the vertical dimension may interact with shame 
proneness to amplify the resulting effects on emotions. Following an interpersonal stressor, 
perceiving oneself as more submissive may predict concurrent depressed and anxious mood, but 
lower anger.  
Perceived Disconnectedness (Horizontal) Predicts Distress in General and Shame Proneness 
May Interact with it 
Shifts toward experiencing oneself as distant from others may predict depressed and 
anxious mood. The degree of communion, affiliation, or closeness to others runs along the 
horizontal axis of social space (Cuddy et al., 2007; Gurtman, 2009; Wiggins, 1991). Withdrawal 
from social relationships, isolation, and loneliness are typical experiences of depression, and are 
characterized by low horizontal communality. For instance, both cold and socially avoidant 
interpersonal styles (low communion, high disconnectedness) correlated with depression 
symptoms (Dinger et al., 2015). Furthermore, social anxiety is characterized by social avoidance 
(APA, 2013). Social anxiety disorder uniquely correlated with perceived low intimacy and 
closeness (Weisman et al., 2011). However, anxiety is a natural response whose function is to 
prepare for danger (Mathews, 1990). Therefore, a threatened loss or rupture in connection would 
likely predict higher depressed and anxious moods. 
Contrary to the two previous predictors, the integrative theory would predict no 
interaction between shame and low communality, although other theories suggest otherwise. The 
integrative theory states that shame is only activated or relevant when there is a threat to social 
self in terms of hierarchical rank, whereas only guilt is associated with inequality in relationships 
(Giner-Sorolla, 2013), or the horizontal axis. However, the sociometer theory (de Hooge, 2014) 
implies relevance to shame when perceiving distance from others via social exclusion and 
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rejection. Therefore, it is possible that shame proneness may interact with both the vertical and 
horizontal axes of social space (i.e., agency and communion). In other words, shame-prone 
individuals may be more sensitive to shifts towards submissive or disconnected status relative to 
others.  
Lastly, perceived interpersonal distance in social stressors may predict angry mood. 
Behaviors associated with anger, such as aggression, impulsivity, conflict, and cynicism, are low 
in affiliation and closeness (Wiggins & Broughton, 1991). Individuals with rejection sensitivity 
showed a similar pattern, with anger being classified as a cold behavior (vs. warm) while those 
with low anger were closer in communion with others (Cain et al., 2017). Therefore, 
interpersonal stressors that result in viewing oneself as becoming less communal, close, 
affiliative, and warm (or more distant and disconnected) would be associated with higher anger.  
Again, theories vary in their implications for interactions with shame proneness and the 
communal dimension. According to the integrative theory of shame, which states that shame 
operates under the vertical dimension only (Giner-Sorolla, 2013), shame proneness should not 
interact with the horizontal dimension in which participants feel less communal. Only guilt 
proneness would be relevant to interactions with this horizontal dimension due to its concern for 
others and relationship quality compared to hierarchical status (shame). On the other hand, the 
sociometer theory describes shame with relevance to the horizontal dimension. Therefore, shame 
proneness may amplify the positive effect of perceived low communality as well, not only 
agency, on increased anger.   
In sum, perceiving oneself as having low communality as a result of an interpersonal 
stressor may predict higher depressed, anxious, and angry mood, but will be independent of 
shame proneness levels. Because shame is thought to operate under a vertical, hierarchical 
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dimension, in which shame is experienced only when social status is falling, it should not, in 
theory, affect the experience of distressing emotions when perceiving oneself as moving along 
the horizontal dimension.  
Present Study 
The aims of this study are threefold: (1) to examine shame proneness as a prospective 
predictor of negative emotions and symptoms (depression, anxiety, anger) in daily life, (2) to 
examine shame proneness as a moderator (amplifier) of effects of negative evaluation (as an 
interpersonal stressor) on negative moods in daily life, and (3) to assess interactions between 
shame proneness and the two dimensions of perceived interpersonal behavior in the context of 
interpersonal stress: submission and disconnectedness. I will examine the hypotheses in the 
context of a sample that will include participants across a broad range of emotional symptoms, 
including those in the clinical range, to optimize generalizability of results for dimensional and 
transdiagnostic groups. 
Hypotheses 
The first study aim is to test shame proneness as a vulnerability factor prospectively 
predicting downstream distress (depression, anxiety, anger) in the context of daily stressors. 
Supporting the conceptualization of shame proneness as a risk factor for psychopathology, I 
hypothesize that higher shame proneness will predict higher average daily depressed, anxious, 
and angry mood using experience sampling methods (see Figure 2). Due to the shared variance 
between shame and guilt proneness, and previous associations of guilt with adaptive behavior 
(e.g., apology/repair), these analyses will control for guilt proneness to examine the unique, 
maladaptive effects of shame proneness (i.e., guilt-free shame) as other studies have done.  
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Hypothesis 1a: Shame proneness will predict higher average daily depressed mood. 
Hypothesis 1b: Shame proneness will predict higher average daily anxious mood. 
Hypothesis 1c: Shame proneness will predict higher average daily angry mood. 
  
Figure 2. (Hypothesis 1) Conceptual models for shame proneness predicting 
average daily distressed mood (outcomes). L2 = Level 2 variable (person); L1 = 
Level 1 variable (repeated measures nested within persons). 
 
The second aim involves testing whether shame proneness moderates the relationship 
between interpersonal stressors and resultant emotional responses. In general (main effect prior 
to testing moderation), I expect that negative evaluation will predict higher depressed, anxious, 
and angry emotions. Additionally, I hypothesize an interaction such that individuals high in 
shame proneness will exhibit greater depressed, anxious, and angry moods in the context of this 
stressor. In other words, negative evaluation will predict higher distressed emotions relative to 
the individual’s mean, and high shame proneness will exacerbate this positive relationship (see 
Figures 3 through 7).  
  31 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Negative evaluation will predict higher negative moods (depression, 
anxiety, anger).  
Hypothesis 2b: Shame proneness will interact with negative evaluation stressors in 
predicting moods, such that the effects of negative evaluation on mood will be stronger for 
those high in shame proneness.   
 
Figure 3. (Hypothesis 2) Conceptual model for shame proneness moderating the 
relationship between negative evaluation interpersonal (IP) stressors and negative 
moods (depression, anxiety, anger) in daily life. L2 = Level 2 variable (person); 
L1 = Level 1 variable (repeated measures nested within persons).  
 
The third aim is to examine shame proneness as a moderator of shifts in perceived 
submission and disconnectedness on distressed mood. Interactions that result in 
movement along the vertical axis (feeling agentic/dominant) may interact with shame 
proneness (e.g., hierarchical/social rank) to polarize the effects on emotional outcomes. 
Regarding the horizontal dimension, although the integrative theory suggests shame 
would only interact with the hierarchical dimension, other theories (i.e., sociometer 
theory) imply a communal component to the experience of shame. Therefore, I predict 
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that shame would interact with both the vertical and the horizontal axes (submission and 
disconnectedness).  
Hypothesis 3a: Perceived submission will predict higher depressed and anxious 
moods, but less anger.  
Hypothesis 3b: Shame proneness will interact with perceived submission in stressor 
contexts, such that for those high in shame proneness, higher submission will more strongly 
predict higher depressed and anxious moods and lower angry mood.  
 
 
Figure 4. (Hypothesis 3) Conceptual model for shame proneness moderating the 
relationship between perceived submission and negative emotions (depression, 
anxiety) in daily life. L2 = Level 2 variable (person); L1 = Level 1 variable 
(repeated measures nested within persons).  
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Figure 5. (Hypothesis 3) Conceptual model for shame proneness moderating the 
relationship between perceived submission and angry mood in daily life. L2 = 




Hypothesis 3c: Higher disconnectedness or distance will predict higher depressed, 
anxious, and angry moods. 
Hypothesis 3d: Shame proneness will interact with perceived disconnectedness, such 
that those high in shame proneness will exhibit higher distressed moods. 
  
Figure 6. (Hypothesis 3) Conceptual model for shame proneness moderating the 
relationship between perceived disconnectedness and negative emotions 
(depression, anxiety, anger) in daily life. L2 = Level 2 variable (person); L1 = 






Figure 7. (Hypotheses 3a-d) Statistical model for shame proneness moderating 
the relationship between interpersonal (IP) variables and negative emotions 
(depression, anxiety, anger) in daily life. L2 = Level 2 variable (person); L1 = 






Participants included 152 undergraduate students (76% female), with ages ranging from 
18 to 31 (M = 19.51, SD = 2.09). The sample consisted of 48.7% Caucasian/White, 22.7% 
Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander, 12.6% Multiracial, 6.7% Lantinx, 5.9% African 
American/Black, 1.7% Middle Eastern, and 1.7% other individuals.  
Sample Size, Power, and Precision 
 MLM uses a different process for calculating sample size and power compared to 
standard regression designs. Power in MLM is dependent on sample size, effect size, and the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (McCoach, 2010). In repeated measures designs, there are two 
sample sizes: the number of Level 2 units (individuals) and the number of Level 1 observations 
across time within individuals. Adequate sample size at both levels maximizes power. 
Simulations (Arend & Shäfer, 2019) suggested that a sample of 150 participants at Level 2 and 
approximately 15 Level 1 repeated measures per person would be sufficiently powered (.80) to 
detect small Level 1 effects (.10), small-to-medium Level 2 effects (.25), and medium cross-level 
interactions (.30).   
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from a private university as part of a larger study on 
personality and stress. They received course credit and $15 compensation at the end of the study. 
Data collection was completed through Qualtrics, an online survey platform. Informed consent 
was collected online prior to participation. Baseline questionnaires included demographic 
information and personality risk factors (shame and guilt proneness).  
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Subsequently, participants completed experience sampling comprised of stressor 
interaction diaries administered three times per week for five weeks (15 surveys total). 
Participants were sent a link on each data collection day via Qualtrics to complete the 
questionnaire by phone or computer (administration time was 5 minutes per day). If they did not 
complete it, they received a reminder email the following day to complete the survey that same 
day. The weekly surveys prompted individuals to describe the most stressful social interaction 
they had in the past three days. Consistent with other diary studies assessing interpersonal 
situations (e.g., Conner et al., 2009; Moskowitz et al., 2009), social interactions were defined as 
lasting at least five minutes and in which the individual changed his or her behavior as a result. 
Participants rated the degree to which the stressful event involved the other individual judging or 
negatively evaluating the participant and resulting self-views of submission and 
disconnectedness. Participants rated these perceptions in addition to concomitant symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and anger.  
Finally, participants visited the lab at the end of the study and participated in a brief (30-
40 minute) clinical interview to screen for diagnoses of anxiety and mood disorders. Individuals 
screening positive for a clinical-level disorder and meeting diagnostic criteria were noted as such 
(described below). Thus, the sample consisted of a broad range of symptom levels, from healthy 
to at-risk.  
Measures and Covariates 
Shame Proneness (Baseline)  
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3 short form; Tangney et al., 2000) 
measures shame proneness and guilt proneness. Answer options assessing for other self-
conscious emotions (i.e., externalized blame, detachment/unconcern, pride) are often excluded 
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for those only interested in shame and guilt. A short version is created by eliminating the 5 
positive scenarios, resulting in an 11-item scenario scale. A sample positive scenario item is, 
“You have recently moved away from your family and everyone has been very helpful. A few 
times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you could.” A sample 
negative scenario item is, “You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.” 
Participants read the 11 negative scenarios and rate how likely they are to react in a given way 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not likely, 5 = very likely). The shame and guilt proneness scales 
assess the tendency to respond with shame (e.g., “You would think: ‘I’m terrible’”) and guilt 
(e.g., “You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down the road”). Shame is 
operationalized as being directed towards the self (e.g., internal, stable, global attributions for 
negative events), and guilt is directed at the behavior (e.g., internal, unstable, specific 
attributions). Responses are summed to create total scale scores ranging from 11 to 55, with 
higher scores indicating higher shame or guilt proneness.  
The TOSCA-3 has demonstrated good psychometric properties. The short version of the 
TOSCA-3 shame scale correlated .94 with its full-length version (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
The TOSCA-3 has demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .76; Tangney et al., 2000) and 
test-retest reliability (r = .85 and .74 for shame and guilt, respectively; Tangney, 1996). In this 
study, internal consistency for the TOSCA-3 short form was α = .79 for shame proneness, α = 
.75 for guilt proneness, and α = .83 for the complete scale. Research supported the TOSCA’s 
construct and discriminant validity (Lacerenza et al., 2020), and factor analysis supported a two-
factor structure (Lacerenza et al., 2020; Luyten et al., 2002). Guilt proneness was used as a 
covariate to assess guilt-free shame.  
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Interpersonal Stressors (Experience Sampling)  
After defining and identifying a stressful social interaction, participants were asked 
follow-up questions created for this study. For the negative evaluation stressor, the item asked, 
“To what extent did this stressful event involve each of the following? ... I felt negatively 
evaluated or judged by someone.” The interaction was assessed and rated on a 0-100 continuous, 
anchored scale (0 = not at all, 50 = moderately, 100 = extremely).  
Self-view outcomes of interpersonal stressors were assessed with the item, “As a result of 
how you responded in the situation, to what extent did you see yourself as…” followed by 
“Assertive, dominant, or powerful” (perceived agency) and “Social, outgoing, or close to others”  
(perceived communion). Agency and communion items were reverse-scored to obtain measures 
of perceived submission (i.e., low agency) and disconnectedness (i.e., low communion. These 
were scored on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 4 = very much).  
In experience sampling methods, single-item measures are often adequate and perform as 
well as 6-item measures (Fisher & To, 2012; van Hooff et al., 2007). Single-item interpersonal 
assessments have been used in other studies with similar methods (e.g., EMA; Scott et al., 2017).  
Negative Moods (Experience Sampling)  
The Profile of Mood States-15 (POMS-15; Cranford et al., 2006; McNair et al., 1971; 
Shacham, 1983), shortened from two previous versions (65 and 37 items), is a 15-item measure 
of transient emotions recommended for use with daily diary studies to ease subject burden 
(Cranford et al., 2006). Items consisted of emotional adjectives grouped into five emotions 
(anxious mood, depressed mood, anger, fatigue, vigor), with each subscale comprising 3 items. 
Only depressed, anxious, and angry moods are reported here. After recalling the interpersonal 
stressor, participants were instructed to rate “how you felt then” on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not 
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at all, 4 = extremely). The three items are averaged for each mood to obtain the score. This study 
used only the anxious, depressed, and angry subscales. Cranford et al. (2006) documented 
reliability when assessing within-person changes in mood. Additionally, the 37-item version has 
shown evidence of internal consistency, convergent and discriminant validity, and confirmatory 
factor analysis revealed a 6-factor structure, consistent with the 65-item version (Baker et al., 
2002). In this study, reliability calculated based on variance components analysis (Cranford et 
al., 2006) was .90. 
Psychopathology  
Symptoms of psychopathology were assessed to examine the extent to which participants 
experienced substantial clinical levels of symptoms. We utilized an abridged or “mini” version of 
the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-5 (ADIS-5; Brown & Barlow, 2014), which 
is a semi-structured clinical interview screening a range of common anxiety (e.g., panic disorder, 
OCD), mood (e.g., bipolar, persistent depressive disorder), and related diagnoses (e.g., PTSD). 
Its items assessed for current endorsement of diagnostic criteria, eliminating extensive query of 
past diagnoses and individual symptom ratings. Abbreviated forms of the ADIS that exclude 
historical items have been used in research when diagnostic history was irrelevant to current 
symptoms and study inclusion (Michelson et al., 2011). Each diagnostic category’s assessment 
followed the item questioning and wording of the full ADIS-5, with a few major exceptions. 
First, the individual simply endorsed the presence or absence (yes/no) of symptoms (e.g., 
palpitations for panic attacks) rather than rating each one on a 9-point (0-8) Likert scale. For 
example, ratings on distress/severity, fear/avoidance, or excessiveness/uncontrollability of each 
symptom were eliminated, and only the presence or absence of each symptom were assessed. 
This change cut ADIS administration time significantly. However, the Mini-ADIS-5 still 
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included a 9-point Likert scale assessing for total distress/impairment (“How much does it bother 
you/interfere?”), ranging from 0 (none) to 8 (very severe) with middle anchors (“mild,” 
“moderate,” and “severe”), and, consistent with the full ADIS, 4 was the clinical cut-off. Next, 
the Mini-ADIS-5 eliminated assessment and screening of less relevant diagnoses (e.g., separation 
anxiety; eating disorder/substance use screener items). Additionally, medical rule-out questions 
were efficiently lumped together at the end of the entire assessment, compared to the full ADIS 
that includes these items after every diagnostic section. The total administration time for the 
Mini-ADIS-5 resulted in 15-20 minutes compared to 3-4 hours, easing participant burden.  
One of two clinical psychology graduate students, both of whom were trained and 
experienced in administering the full ADIS-5, administered the Mini-ADIS-5 to screen for 
diagnostic status. Due to its recent development, psychometric properties of the full ADIS-5 
have not yet been published. The full ADIS-5 was revised from the ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 
1994) to reflect updated DSM-5 criteria and has excellent interrater and test-retest reliability, and 
concurrent validity (Brown et al., 1994; Brown et al., 2001). In this sample, positively screened 
primary diagnoses were social anxiety (10.5%), generalized anxiety (9.2%), major depressive 
(5.3%), posttraumatic stress (5.3%), and bipolar spectrum (1.3%) disorders. Those with any 
anxiety disorder (e.g., including obsessive-compulsive, panic, specific phobia, separation 
anxiety, unspecified disorders), primary or secondary, were 34.9%, and those with any primary 
or secondary depressive disorder (e.g., including persistent depressive disorder, premenstrual 
dysphoric, specified/unspecified disorders) were 15.8% of the sample.  
Data Analytic Plan 
Overview of Statistical Approach 
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Hypotheses were tested using mixed models in SPSS 27.0, an analytical strategy 
appropriate for multilevel designs in which repeated measures (e.g., diary entries) are nested 
within a higher-level (i.e., hierarchical) model. Multilevel modeling (MLM) was appropriate for 
several reasons. First, it accounts for between- and within-person variability. Second, its 
analytical approach avoids the assumption of independent observations, given that repeated 
measures within individuals were dependent. Third, it allows for unbalanced data, or different 
amounts of data among participants. Last, it permits within-person missing data. Level 1 
variables are those that involve repeated measures data; they occur within the individual, and 
they are nested within the higher-order variables of Level 2 (e.g., the individual). In this study, 
Level 2 variables included shame proneness and guilt proneness (covariate to assess guilt-free 
shame); Level 1 variables include negative social evaluation and social self-perceptions 
(submission and disconnectedness). Level 2 predictors were grand-mean centered (i.e., the 
variable mean is subtracted from individual scores), with the exception of gender, and Level 1 
predictors were person-mean centered (i.e., the individual’s mean across entries was subtracted 
from each daily score). Analyses were completed using restricted maximum likelihood (REML) 
parameter estimates, which are recommended when not testing the fit of nested models (Heck et 
al., 2010). Additionally, consistent with repeated measures designs, an autoregressive (AR1) 
covariance structure was used. 
First, tests of unconditional effects were examined for significant variability of intercepts, 
the presence of which would indicate using random intercepts. Preliminary analyses also tested 
for random variance in slopes. Next, for hypothesis 1, I tested for prospective main effects of 
baseline shame proneness on subsequent daily depression symptoms, anxiety, and anger, while 
controlling for guilt proneness (a covariate in all models). Then, for hypothesis 2, I incorporated 
  43 
 
main effects of negative evaluation and shame proneness, as well as the interaction terms of 
shame proneness × negative evaluation. I repeated this process in hypothesis 3 for submission 
and disconnectedness as Level 1 predictors. Simple slope tests were completed for any 
significant interactions.   
  





 Preliminary data screening suggested some deviations from normality. The variables 
depressed mood, dominance, and affiliation demonstrated positive skew; guilt proneness 
exhibited negative skew; and inspection of histograms suggested that perceived negative 
evaluation was somewhat platykurtic. It is possible that recalling the most stressful event 
somewhat constrained responses to be more extreme. However, all skew and kurtosis values 
were within a reasonable range (less than │1.15│; Field, 2013); therefore, untransformed data 
were used in analyses. There were no significant outliers (values with standardized scores of 
greater than 3.29, i.e., p <.001).  
Scatterplots showed evidence of nonlinear relationships with mood outcomes for the 
variables of shame proneness, guilt proneness, and negatively evaluation. Therefore, these 
variables were tested for quadratic effects. Viewing the self as submissive and disconnected did 
not show evidence of nonlinear relationships, so these variables were not tested for quadratic 
effects. To examine which moods contained quadratic relationships with shame and guilt, linear 
(e.g., shame) and quadratic (e.g., shame*shame) terms were included as predictors in models 
testing hypothesis 1. Significant quadratic effects were found for quadratic guilt predicting 
depression and anxiety, but not anger, and thus were included in subsequent models and 
hypotheses predicting these emotions. The quadratic effect of shame*shame predicting anxiety 
approached significance when controlling for guilt and thus was included in subsequent models 
and hypotheses predicting anxious mood.  
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A similar process was conducted for testing quadratic effects of feeling negatively 
evaluated, whose scatterplots also showed evidence of nonlinearity. Preserving the significant 
quadratic results from the prior procedure, shame and guilt quadratic effects were automatically 
included in models testing hypothesis 2 for that respective mood. To test for a significant 
quadratic effect for feeling negatively evaluated, its quadratic term was included as a predictor 
along with the interaction term with shame. Quadratic terms for feeling negatively evaluated 
were significant in predicting all three emotions, but the effects were negligible thus removed 
from the models. All interactions with quadratic terms (e.g., shame*shame*negative evaluation) 
were also nonsignificant thus excluded from final models.  
Means, standard deviations, normality, and reliability estimates are shown in Table 1. 
The original dataset included 159 participants. Although MLM allows for missing and 
unbalanced data (Field, 2013), exploration of missingness patterns showed only 2% missing 
values within participants who provided data. Thus, raw data were used in analyses. Average 
number of diaries completed by each individual was 12.57 out of 15 possible entries (SD = 3.50). 
Zero-order correlations between study variables are displayed in Table 2.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability 
Variable 
Range 
M SD α Skew Kurtosis 
Min Max 
Level 2        
     Shame Proneness 14 51 34.7 8.0 .79 -0.25 -0.43 
     Guilt Proneness 28 55 45.5 5.9 .75 -0.61 0.01 
Level 1        
     Negative  
   Evaluation 
0 100 34.2 35.4  0.59 -1.15 
     Submission 0 4 3.0 1.1  0.19 0.11 
     Disconnectedness 0 4 3.0 1.1  -0.88 -0.02 
     Depressed Mood 0 4 1.2 1.1  0.94 0.19 
     Anxious Mood 0 4 1.7 1.1  0.38 -0.77 
     Angry Mood 0 4 1.5 1.1  0.50 -0.67 
Note. Negative Evaluation = perceived negative evaluation; Submission and Disconnectedness 
are viewing oneself as submissive and disconnected, respectively.  
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Table 2 
Bivariate Correlations for Study Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Shame  
      Proneness 
̶        
2. Guilt   
      Proneness 
.42*** ̶ 
      
3. Negative  
      Evaluation 
.17*** -.08** ̶ 
     
4. Submission -.03 -.03 -.29*** ̶     
5. Disconnectedness .03 -.05* -.10*** .50*** ̶    
6. Depressed Mood .17*** -.06* .54*** -.24*** .13*** ̶   
7. Anxious Mood .13*** -.03 .52*** -.16*** -.12*** .73*** ̶  
8. Angry Mood .10*** -.07** .58*** -.33*** .06* .66*** .50*** ̶ 
Note. Submission = view of self as submissive; Disconnected = view of self as disconnected. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Repeated measures variables (all except shame and guilt 
proneness) here reflect aggregated mean levels over time. 
 
Analyses were first completed with covariates in the model (i.e., gender, guilt proneness). 
Gender was consistently not a significant predictor across models, therefore it was removed from 
final analyses to preserve degrees of freedom and statistical power. Guilt proneness was included 
irrespective of significance level in order to produce measures of guilt-free shame. Preliminary 
analyses showed significant variability in intercepts and slopes, thus random intercepts and 
slopes were used in all models.  
Primary Analyses 
Hypothesis 1a: Shame proneness will predict higher average daily depressed mood.  
The first model examined whether shame proneness prospectively predicted higher 
average daily depressed mood. Consistent with preliminary analyses, the guilt proneness 
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covariate included a linear and quadratic term. As expected, controlling for guilt proneness, 
shame proneness predicted depressed mood, such that those higher in shame, compared to the 
group mean, experienced higher average daily levels of depressed mood across time (see Table 
3). Guilt proneness showed a non-significant linear but significant quadratic effect in predicting 
depressed mood; at higher levels of guilt proneness, the initially non-significant negative 
relationship with depressed mood became significant and more positive.  
Hypothesis 1b: Shame proneness will predict higher average daily anxious mood.  
The next model examined whether shame proneness prospectively predicted higher levels 
of anxious mood across time. Shame and guilt proneness both included quadratic effects. As 
expected, shame proneness predicted higher average daily levels of anxious mood when 
controlling for guilt proneness (see Table 3). Shame’s linear but not quadratic effect was 
significant. Guilt proneness did not predict anxious mood at low levels of guilt but did at higher 
levels.  
Hypothesis 1c: Shame proneness will predict higher average angry mood.  
The third model in hypothesis 1 examined whether shame proneness predicted higher 
levels of angry mood across time. Contrary to expectations, guilt-free shame proneness did not 






Hypothesis 1: Shame Proneness Prospectively Predicting Higher Average Negative Moods Across 5 Weeks, Controlling for Guilt 
Proneness 
 
Depressed Mood Anxious Mood Angry Mood 
b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI 
Shame Proneness  0.021** 0.007 [0.007, 0.035] 0.019* 0.009 [0.003, 0.036] 0.016 0.008 [-0.001, 0.032] 
Shame*Shame    0.002 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003]    
Guilt Proneness -0.009 0.010 [-0.030, 0.011] -0.002 0.012 [-0.026, 0.022] -0.016 0.011 [-0.038, 0.006] 
Guilt*Guilt 0.003* 0.001 [0.001, 0.004] 0.003* 0.001 [0.001, 0.006]    
Note. Shaded regions indicated non-significant quadratic effects therefore were excluded in the final model. Effects and standard 
errors were placed with three decimals due to small effects. b = unstandardized slope, SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval. 
Shame and guilt were grand-mean centered. Shame x Shame and Guilt x Guilt are quadratic effects.  




Hypothesis 2a: Negative evaluation will predict higher negative mood (depression, 
anxiety, anger).  
As expected, within-person fluctuations in feeling more negatively evaluated in specific 
situations consistently predicted higher average levels of depressed, anxious, and angry moods 
across time (see Table 4).  
Hypothesis 2b: Shame proneness will interact with negative evaluation stressors in 
predicting moods, such that the effects of negative evaluation on mood will be stronger for 
those higher in shame proneness.  
The same pattern of main effects was found for shame proneness predicting distressed 
moods across all hypothesis models thus are not reported further. Additionally, guilt proneness 
showed similar effects across moods and hypotheses unless reported otherwise.  
As expected, perceived negative evaluation predicted higher in-situation depressed and 
anxious moods (see Table 4). However, contrary to hypotheses, there were no interactions 
between perceived negative evaluation and shame proneness in predicting these moods. In other 
words, shame proneness did not exacerbate the negative effects of feeling negatively evaluated 
via higher depressed and anxious moods.  
 As expected, perceived negative evaluation predicted higher subsequent angry mood. 
Also consistent with hypotheses, there was a significant interaction with shame proneness. At 
low levels of shame (1 SD below the sample mean), the effect of negative evaluation on 
predicting angry mood was b = 0.005 (SE = 0.001, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.003, 0.007]). At high 
levels of shame (1 SD above sample mean), the effect of negative evaluation on angry mood was 
b = 0.01 (SE = 0.001, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.008, 0.012]). Those with higher shame proneness 
  51 
 
experienced angry moods twice as high following social stressors involving negative evaluation 




Hypothesis 2: Multilevel Modeling Examining the Interaction between Shame Proneness (Controlling for Guilt) and Feeling Negatively 
Evaluated in Predicting Negative Moods Across 5 Weeks 
 
Depressed Mood Anxious Mood Angry Mood 
b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI 
Shame Proneness  0.019** 0.006 [0.004, 0.034] 0.018* 0.008 [0.002, 0.034] 0.013 0.007 [-0.001, 0.028] 
Shame x Shame    0.001 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003]    
Guilt Proneness -0.007 0.009 [-0.025, 0.012] 0.001 0.012 [-0.022, 0.025] -0.014 0.010 [-0.034, 0.006] 
Guilt x Guilt 0.002* 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 0.003* 0.001 [0.001, 0.006]    
Negative  
   Evaluation 
0.007*** 0.001 [0.006, 0.009] 0.006*** 0.001 [0.004, 0.008] 0.007*** 0.001 [0.006, 0.009] 
NegEval x Shame 0.001 0.001 [-0.001, 0.001] 0.001 0.001 [-0.001, 0.001] 0.001** 0.001 [0.001, 0.001] 
Note. Shaded regions indicated non-significant quadratic effects in the model therefore were excluded in the final model. Effects and 
standard errors were placed with three decimals due to small effects. NegEval = feeling negatively evaluated, b = unstandardized slope; 
SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval. Shame and guilt were grand-mean centered. NegEval was person-centered. Shame x 
Shame and Guilt x Guilt are quadratic effects. NegEval x Shame is an interaction. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Bolded font indicates significance at p < .05. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Perceived submission will predict higher depressed and anxious 
moods, but less anger.  
I hypothesized that viewing oneself as submissive following a stressful interaction would 
predict higher depressed and anxious but less angry moods. Self-perceived submission predicted 
higher depressed and lower angry moods within situations, as expected, but did not predict 
anxious mood, contrary to the hypothesis (see Table 5). Guilt proneness deviated from previous 
patterns in predicting distressed moods only for depression, which showed a non-significant 
relationship.  
Hypothesis 3b: Shame proneness will interact with perceived submission in stressor 
contexts, such that for those high in shame proneness, higher submission will predict 
higher depressed and anxious moods but less angry mood.  
Contrary to hypotheses, shame proneness and viewing oneself as submissive following a 
stressful interaction did not interact when predicting any of the distressed moods (see Table 5).  
Hypothesis 3c: Higher disconnectedness will predict higher depressed, anxious, and 
angry moods.  
As expected, stressful interactions resulting in viewing oneself as disconnected predicted 
more depressed and angry moods in the situation, but, contrary to hypotheses, not anxious mood 
(see Table 5).   
Hypothesis 3d: Shame proneness will interact with perceived disconnectedness, such 
that those high in shame proneness will exhibit higher distressed moods. 
Lastly, contrary to hypotheses, there was no interaction between perceived 
disconnectedness and shame proneness in predicting depressed, anxious, or angry moods (see 




Hypothesis 3: Multilevel Models Examining the Interaction between Shame Proneness (Controlling for Guilt) and Viewing Oneself as 
Submissive or Disconnected in Predicting Negative Moods Across 5 Weeks 
 Depression Anxiety Anger 
 b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI 
Submission          
   Shame Proneness 0.023** 0.007 [0.008, 0.037] 0.021* 0.009 [0.003, 0.038] 0.015 0.008 [-0.001, 0.031] 
   Shame x Shame    0.002 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003]    
   Guilt Proneness -0.009 0.011 [-0.031, 0.012] -0.003 0.013 [-0.027, 0.022] -0.015 0.011 [-0.036, 0.006] 
   Guilt x Guilt 0.002 0.001 [-0.001, 0.005] 0.003* 0.001 [0.001, 0.006]    
   Submission 0.090** 0.027 [0.037, 0.143] -0.020 0.037 [-0.094, 0.054] -0.151*** 0.027 [-0.205, -0.097] 
   Submiss x Shame -0.004 0.003 [-0.010, 0.003] -0.002 0.003 [-0.009, 0.005]  0.001 0.003 [-0.005, 0.008] 
          
Disconnectedness          
   Shame Proneness 0.019* 0.007 [0.004, 0.033] 0.019* 0.009 [0.002, 0.036]  0.012 0.008 [-0.004, 0.029] 
   Shame x Shame    0.001 0.001 [-0.001, 0.003]    
   Guilt Proneness -0.010 0.011 [-0.031, 0.011] -0.002 0.012 [-0.026, 0.023] -0.014 0.011 [-0.036, 0.008] 
   Guilt x Guilt 0.002* 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 0.003* 0.001 [0.001, 0.006]    
   Disconnected 0.100** 0.027 [0.041, 0.150] 0.028 0.035 [-0.042, 0.098]  0.148*** 0.027 [0.095, 0.200] 
   Disconn x Shame 0.005 0.004 [-0.002, 0.012] -0.001 0.001 [-0.008, 0.006]  0.004 0.003 [-0.002, 0.011] 
Note. Shaded regions indicated non-significant quadratic effects in the model therefore were excluded in the final model. Effects and 
standard errors were placed with three decimals due to small effects. Submission = view of self as submissive; Disconnected = view of 
self as disconnected. b = unstandardized slope; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval. Shame and guilt were grand-mean 
centered. View of self variables were person-centered. Shame x Shame and Guilt x Guilt are quadratic effects.  







Purpose of the Study  
 The purpose of the study was threefold. First, this study sought to examine shame 
proneness as a transdiagnostic risk factor for dimensional levels of symptoms via depressed, 
anxious, and angry moods. The literature has shown robust associations between shame 
proneness (as measured by the TOSCA) and psychopathology across disorders (Cândea & 
Szentagotai-Tătar, 2013; Dearing et al., 2005; Hastings et al., 2002; Hawes et al., 2013; Rüsch et 
al., 2007). However, research has primarily been cross-sectional in nature and has not addressed 
the relationship with shame proneness (vs. state measures) for prospectively predicting 
subclinical levels of distressed moods. This paper added a unique contribution to the study of 
these relationships by applying experience sampling methods and a prospective design. Next, 
this study aimed to test whether shame-prone individuals are particularly at risk for distressed 
moods in the context of negative social evaluation stressors. Because shame is characterized as a 
social emotion, shame proneness may place individuals at increased risk for distress in social 
stressor situations compared to non-social stressors due to the theorized resulting fluctuations in 
self-perception in such contexts (Giner-Sorolla, 2013). However, research has not examined how 
shame proneness may interact with interpersonal stressors in prospectively predicting distressed 
moods in daily life. A third aim of this study was to test whether shame proneness would interact 
with situational shifts on the vertical and horizontal social cognitive dimensions. Given that 
shame is thought to be a self-conscious emotion, it is understandable that individuals higher in 
shame proneness would be more sensitive to shifts in these dimensions of self-evaluation 
following social interactions. However, this newer, integrative theory (i.e., Giner-Sorolla, 2013), 
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which states that shame is responsive to shifts in hierarchical standing (i.e., vertical dimension), 
has not been tested. Additionally, shame-prone individuals may be sensitive to shifts in self-
perceived disconnectedness from society (i.e., horizontal dimension), according to the 
sociometer theory (de Hooge, 2014). The results of this study help clarify the role that changes in 
self-perception play in affecting distressed mood for individuals with higher shame proneness.  
Major Findings  
Hypothesis 1: Shame Proneness will Prospectively Predict Distressed Moods  
Across models, (guilt-free) shame proneness predicted more depressed and anxious 
moods during stressful social interactions, as expected, but not angry mood, contrary to 
predictions. This study expanded upon research showing connections between shame proneness 
and psychopathology by measuring symptoms dimensionally across daily life situations in a 
mixed sample of individuals with clinical levels of depression and anxiety as well as non-clinical 
individuals. Results are consistent with studies correlating shame proneness with depression 
symptoms in non-clinical samples (Malinowski et al., 2017), as well as feelings of self-
inadequacy and low worth (i.e., proxies for shame) correlating with depressed mood in clinical 
samples (Zahn et al., 2015). Additionally, in a meta-analysis that included both state and trait 
measures of shame, shame frequently co-occurred with depressive symptoms (Kim et al., 2011). 
These results also build upon research linking shame with anxiety by examining specific 
contexts (naturalistic stressors) or if-then patterns, which may help explain why the literature has  
shown mixed findings regarding the effects of shame proneness on anxiety as a dimensional 
symptom (most often cross-sectionally). For example, while shame proneness was strongly 
correlated with state- and trait-level anxiety in undergraduate students (Malinowski et al., 2017), 
it did not predict concurrent anxiety in non-clinical children (Rodriguez et al., 2019). The results 
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of this study build upon our understanding of shame proneness as a risk factor for prospectively 
predicting depressed and anxious mood states after specific stressful events, whereas other 
studies have largely been cross-sectional, such as the above studies, and only occasionally used 
stressful events to inform data. Additionally, this study used a mixed sample of clinical and non-
clinical individuals. When sub-clinical distressed moods are experienced over time, this may lead 
to the development of clinical-level disorders. By including individuals with a range of 
transdiagnostic and dimensional symptoms, this study has the unique ability to examine the 
contribution shame proneness has towards vulnerability for psychopathology. By controlling for 
guilt proneness, it is unlikely that these associations are simply showing that shame proneness 
predicted negative moods in general.  
Theories of shame may explain why shame proneness predicted depressed and anxious 
moods. Consistent with the self-behavior view (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), shame, depression 
and anxiety share similar cognitive attributional styles (i.e., internal, stable, global; Heimberg et 
al., 1989; Schleider et al., 2014; Sweeney et al., 1986; Tangney et al., 1992b) and the behavioral 
tendencies for social withdrawal and avoidance (Fernández-Theoduloz et al., 2019; Ottenbreit et 
al., 2014; Tangney, 1996). Additionally, shame, depression, and anxiety may operate similarly in 
terms of hierarchical standing. According to the hierarchical-reciprocal and integrative views (de 
Hooge, 2014; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, 2013), shame is theorized to be an 
internalized acceptance of low social standing with resulting submissive behavior. Individuals 
with persistent depression were characterized by submissive behavior on the interpersonal 
circumplex (Locke et al., 2017), and both depression and anxiety symptoms were associated with 
higher mean submissive and quarrelsome behavior (Rappaport et al., 2014), indicating greater 
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movement along the vertical axis. These shared characteristics may explain why shame 
proneness predicted depressed and anxious moods.  
 On the other hand, there were largely no main effects of shame proneness predicting 
average daily levels of angry mood. This is surprising given that shame theorists described anger 
as the “second face of shame” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) and observed a “shame-rage” cycle 
(Lewis, 1971; Tangney et al., 2007), as well as other associations linking state and trait shame 
with anger and aggression across samples (Bennett et al., 2005; Harper & Arias, 2004; Paulhus et 
al., 2004; Scott et al., 2015; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It is possible that using different 
methodology produced different results: whereas the above studies used concurrent analyses and 
only one used event-specific (vs. general) measurements through behavioral observations (i.e., 
Bennett et al., 2005), this study used daily diaries across time for specific events. It is also 
possible that the types of clinical disorders or symptoms included in our sample (i.e., primarily 
depression and anxiety spectrum, internalizing symptoms) may have impacted the relationship 
we observed between shame proneness and anger. We may expect to find stronger associations 
with externalizing spectrum disorders (e.g., antisocial personality disorder or substance use 
disorders). Additionally, according to Giner-Sorolla’s (2013) theory of shame, anger may only 
arise as a secondary reaction to defensive shame. In this case, anger would hypothetically only 
be expressed approximately 50% of the time, if split between unworthiness and defensive shame, 
in which case there may not be a consistent relationship in shame proneness predicting anger. 
Furthermore, since Giner-Sorolla defined anger as a secondary reaction, it may be unlikely that 
anger is experienced immediately during the interaction—when daily diaries are assessing for 
distressed moods—as opposed to being experienced at some point following the interaction. 
Therefore, more research is needed to examine the relationship between shame proneness and 
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anger to explain this contradictory finding. Future studies could parse out shame into defensive 
and unworthiness shame, or perhaps contrast those with internalizing and externalizing disorders 
and symptoms to observe how this may affect results. 
 Briefly, bearing relevance to theories of shame and guilt, guilt proneness in this study 
showed deleterious effects only at high levels. While low levels of guilt were not associated with 
distressed moods, higher levels of guilt proneness prospectively predicted higher depressed and 
anxious moods. This relationship was not seen for angry mood, where quadratic effects were not 
significant. These findings contradict the self-behavior view of shame and guilt, which depicts 
guilt proneness as an adaptive emotion leading to reparative behavior. The fact that guilt did not 
predict distress outcomes linearly fits past research finding no or inverse relationships of shame-
free guilt to psychopathology. However, this study suggests that the highest levels of guilt 
proneness might in fact contribute to risk for psychopathology. Theories of shame and guilt may 
consider consequences of these moral emotions under low and high levels, which may result in 
different outcomes.  
Hypothesis 2: Shame Proneness will Moderate the Relationship between Negative Evaluation 
and Distressed Moods  
Negative evaluation predicted all three distressed moods, though there was only a 
significant interaction with shame proneness for predicting anger. The main effects of negative 
evaluation are consistent with literature indicating the inherently stressful nature of social 
evaluation for humans in general (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). The stronger association 
between negative evaluation and anxious mood, compared to depressed or angry moods, is not 
surprising given that social evaluative threat may be particularly salient for individuals with 
social anxiety (APA, 2013; Goldin et al., 2009). Given that anxious and depressed moods were 
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more closely correlated using daily diaries under circumstances of perceived rejection (Starr & 
Davila, 2012), the high comorbidity rate between anxious and depressive disorders (Richards, 
2011) may be partially explained by negative evaluation stressors. This study adds to the 
understanding of negative evaluation as a contributor to distress and psychopathology.  
While shame proneness was predicted to exacerbate the effects of negative evaluation on 
distressed moods, and shame predicted all distressed moods except anger, it was surprising to 
find that there was a significant interaction only in predicting anger. While negative evaluation 
predicted all three distressed moods, individuals with high shame proneness were at increased 
risk for experiencing only angry mood, not depressed or anxious moods, in the context of social 
evaluative threat. These results suggest that individuals with high shame are particularly 
sensitive towards the effects of negative evaluation and that this distress is expressed via anger 
rather than depression or anxiety. These findings on increased reactivity via anger extend 
previous research showing associations between interpersonal rejection and anger/aggression 
(Leary et al., 2006) and may help explain the increased expressions of anger in highly shame-
prone individuals, or those with BPD (Kockler et al., 2020; Rüsch et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2017). 
These results are particularly consistent with those of Scott et al. (2017), who found greater 
anger and shame reactivity in response to perceived rejection stressors using EMA in women 
with more BPD symptoms, a group that tends to have high shame proneness (Ritter et al., 2014; 
Rüsch et al., 2007; Wiklander et al., 2012). Additionally, the results of this study are in line with 
the social rank theory, which states that individuals with an inferior self-view respond with 
quarrelsomeness when criticized (Fournier et al., 2002). Therefore, shame-prone individuals may 
be at increased risk for angry mood following negative evaluation stressors. 
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On the other hand, individuals higher in shame proneness were not more vulnerable to 
experiencing depressed and anxious moods in response to negative evaluation stressors. This is 
surprising given the effects of negative social evaluation on mood and shame. Being negatively 
evaluated implies having lower social rank, an evolutionary perspective that has been used to 
explain mechanisms of depression (Price et al., 1994). Depression frequently co-occurs with 
anxiety (Richards, 2011), implying similar underlying mechanisms, and socially anxious 
individuals may be particularly sensitive to negative evaluation (DSM-5; APA, 2013) and social 
threat stressors (Goldin et al., 2009). With theories of shame generally holding shame to be a 
socially evaluative emotion, one would expect there to be an interaction between negative 
evaluation and shame proneness in predicting increased depressed and anxious moods. However, 
this study only found main effects for both. It is possible that anger plays a more prominent role 
in shame’s interaction with negative evaluation, wherein individuals with more shame proneness 
are as likely as those with less shame to react with depressed or anxious moods following 
negative evaluation but are more likely to react with anger following the same stressor. It is 
unclear why this may be the case, though it is possible that shame may be so “painful” (Lewis, 
1971) that individuals with higher shame proneness are less likely to accept (or even 
acknowledge) a submissive, inferior social stance relative to the other (via depressed and anxious 
moods). Instead, they may object, in a sense, to this placement or verdict by reacting with anger, 
though this “humiliated fury” reaction may be specific to Western cultures (Kirchner et al., 
2018). Therefore, on days when individuals felt more negatively evaluated, they may have been 
more reactive to this state by way of anger expression. If this is the case, then these results may 
be at least partially consistent with Giner-Sorolla’s (2013) integrative theory, which describes 
shame as being composed of defensive and unworthiness qualities. Defensive shame, in which 
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the individual rejects his lowered placement, may be more readily experienced by shame-prone 
individuals, whereas unworthiness shame (i.e., an acceptance of low social evaluation) may be 
experienced less frequently, under infrequent and specific circumstances, or perhaps is less 
characteristic of shame than defensive shame.  
Or, given the dimensional inclusion of symptoms in this study, it is possible that anger 
may be initially experienced but over time may lead to subsequent depression and/or anxiety 
after repeated negative evaluations and an increased propensity towards internalizing of this 
social rank. For example, coping with or regulating anger by expressing it inwardly (e.g., 
suppressed, withheld) instead of outwardly (e.g., verbal or physical aggression) may be 
associated with avoidance behavior consistent with the behavioral inhibition system (Daniel et 
al., 2009), though those authors’ prospective study did not show an association between higher 
levels of inwardly expressed anger and suicidal behavior or major depressive disorder. On the 
other hand, internalized anger predicted depressive and anxiety symptoms in regression analyses 
(Bridewell & Chang, 1997). Further research using longitudinal designs can seek to explain why 
shame proneness is more likely to place individuals at increased risk for experiencing anger 
rather than depressed or anxious moods following negative evaluation stressors. This study 
contributes to the body of research on shame proneness and its theories by implementing daily 
diaries in naturalistic contexts to assess event-specific emotions following interpersonal 
stressors.   
Hypothesis 3: Shame Proneness will Moderate the Relationship between Self-View 
(Submission and Disconnectedness) and Distressed Moods 
First, consistent with hypotheses, there were main effects for submission predicting 
higher depressed and lower angry moods, and main effects for disconnectedness predicting 
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higher depressed and angry moods. Surprisingly, there were no main effects for either social 
dimension predicting anxious mood. This may be consistent with some theories of anxiety, such 
as the interpersonal pathoplasticity model of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Przeworski et 
al., 2011). Research has shown support for a mutually influential relationship between 
interpersonal factors (e.g., social dimensions within the interpersonal circumplex) and GAD 
psychopathology, with different clusters of personality being spread across the interpersonal 
circumplex for these individuals. Additionally, worry has been associated with higher self-
perceived affiliative (i.e., lower disconnected) behavior, while social anxiety has been associated 
with higher submissive behavior (Erickson et al., 2016), showing different patterns of 
interpersonal functioning across anxiety symptom spectrums. With heterogeneity in interpersonal 
behavior, one would not expect to see a consistent relationship between submission or 
disconnectedness and anxiety symptoms, thus possibly explaining the nonsignificant main 
effects for submission and disconnectedness. Given that the sample in our study consisted of 
GAD as the second most common disorder diagnosed (only approximately 1% less than the most 
common, social anxiety disorder), it is possible that heterogeneity in interpersonal functioning 
resulted in a non-unified relationship between submission and anxious mood. 
Next, individuals with higher shame proneness did not experience greater depressed and 
anxious but lower angry moods when perceiving themselves as submissive in interpersonal stress 
contexts (i.e., no moderation effects). Despite the expected sensitivity toward downward shifts in 
social ranking according to the integrative theory (Giner-Sorolla, 2013), these individuals were 
not more sensitive to perceived submission relative to lower-shame peers. These results contrast 
findings where perceived inferiority resulted in submission (Fournier et al., 2002), and where 
there were associations between submission and social anxiety disorder (Weisman et al., 2011) 
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and higher depression and anxiety levels (Rappaport et al., 2017). However, it is not surprising 
that depressed and anxious moods showed similar patterns of non-significant interactions with 
shame proneness given their frequent comorbidity (Richards, 2011) and likely shared 
transdiagnostic mechanisms (Barlow et al., 2016).  
Despite a main effect consistent with the literature showing that submission predicted less 
angry mood, having higher levels of shame proneness did not exacerbate this effect by resulting 
in even lower anger reactions. A nonsignificant interaction is inconsistent with prior research 
showing that individuals who felt inferior to the ‘other’ submitted more readily but were more 
quarrelsome when they were in positions of higher authority (i.e., perceived dominance), and 
that those without a self-view of inferiority did not display quarrelsomeness as often (Fournier et 
al., 2002). In other words, perceived inferiority was characterized by either less or more frequent 
anger expressions, depending on the ranking status of the other, showing evidence for larger 
contrasts in anger compared to those without this self-evaluation. Other studies have also shown 
exacerbated anger responses in highly shame-prone individuals, such as BPD (Kockler et al., 
2020; Rüsch et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2015). Of course, it is also possible that the current study 
was simply underpowered to detect small interaction effects. 
The results of this study do not support newer theories of shame (e.g., de Hooge, 2014; 
Giner-Sorolla, 2013), which place shame along a vertical axis of perceived social hierarchy and 
ranking. According to these theories, shame-prone individuals would be expected to be more 
sensitive toward shifts in social status, which would theoretically result in emotional shifts 
paralleling those for increased submission (i.e., higher depressed and anxious moods, lower 
anger). However, perceived submission did not more strongly predict depressed or anxious 
moods or decreased anger for those higher in shame proneness. It is possible that a more 
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pathological sample is needed to demonstrate these effects. However, this is unlikely to explain 
the nonsignificant results. The measure of shame proneness used in this study captures shame in 
its most dysfunctional form (i.e., experienced in response to relatively minor incidents and 
resulting in rigidly avoidant behavior) and is correlated with psychopathology (Cândea & 
Szentagotai-Tătar, 2013). Individuals scoring higher on this measure would then be expected to 
show similar dysfunctional patterns with distressing moods. To my knowledge, no study has 
examined shame proneness as a risk factor for these distressed moods following interpersonal 
stressors in daily life, particularly those involving downward shifts in social rank. This study had 
the unique ability to examine shifts in mood following specific interpersonal contexts that 
included changes in hierarchical standing. It is possible that results supporting the above theories 
were not observed if the interpersonal stressors did not include an evaluative component. For 
example, an individual could experience a stressful interaction where he felt more submissive 
than the other but with the interaction being devoid of important elements that would activate a 
shame-prone individual’s shame response. In this sense, it is important to note that this study did 
not directly test the above theories but rather has overlapping concepts to enable some 
extrapolations towards them. It is also possible that our relatively simple (one-item) measures of 
social cognitive dimension were not able to capture enough variability in the targeted constructs. 
Future studies can more directly assess these relationships by utilizing more robust diary surveys 
and by controlling the type of interpersonal stressor experienced, although this may be at the cost 
of naturalistic observations (i.e., daily diaries) if difficult to obtain an adequate dose of specific 
stressor types.  
 Next, contrary to expectations, shame-prone individuals were not more at risk for 
experiencing distressed moods associated with interpersonal stressors involving perceived 
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disconnectedness (horizontal axis). These results are inconsistent with the author’s hypotheses 
and de Hooge’s (2014) sociometer theory. This suggests that shame may not operate along a 
continuum of how close the individual feels to others (i.e., communality). Puzzlingly, negative 
evaluation, characterized by cold-dominant behavior involving both vertical and horizontal axes, 
showed a significant interaction with shame proneness when predicting angry mood, whereas 
both sets of interactions when parsing out vertical from horizontal axes were nonsignificant. As 
stated above, it may be that a more specific type of interpersonal stressor is needed for shame-
prone individuals to be more reactive towards. In particular, there may need to be a perceived 
evaluative component beyond just a perceived shift in hierarchical ranking or communal status. 
On the other hand, it may be that shame is insensitive to shifts in these axes. Although possible, 
this is less likely to be the case given the inherent disconnectedness likely felt when an individual 
is perceiving negative evaluation. Therefore, future studies can examine specific types of 
stressors that include “all of the above” stressful components that shame-prone individuals may 
be sensitive towards, including negative evaluation, perceived submission, and perceived 
disconnectedness. By allowing for variation in the types of stressors used in this study, there may 
have been interactions that involved perceived disconnectedness, for example, but not an 
evaluative component, thereby not activating a shame-prone individual’s shame response. 
Determining to what extent an individual’s response may or may not be explained by 
submission, disconnectedness, or the combination of both (i.e., negative evaluation) in negative 
evaluation stressors may help deconstruct which components trigger changes in distressing 
emotions using only instances that shame-prone individuals are more reactive towards.   
Implications  
Clinical Implications  
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The results of this study may suggest potential implications with regard to interventions. 
First, shame proneness as a general risk factor for distressing moods indicates the necessity for 
reducing the tendency of an individual to experience shame when experienced too frequently, too 
intensely, or not appropriately. While there may be a benefit to and rationale for experiencing 
shame in general (e.g., evolutionary perspectives on the function of shame; (Fessler, 2007; 
Gilbert, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, 2013), shame proneness, as measured by the TOSCA-3, has shown 
consistent associations with psychopathology (e.g., Cândea & Szentagotai-Tăta, 2018). Given 
the potentially adaptive functions of shame, one should be cautious not to brand all shame as 
dysfunctional. The TOSCA-3 consistently defines shame as having only withdrawal/avoidance 
behavior and does not assess for approach behavior in response to shame. Additionally, this 
measure captures shame in its most dysfunctional form – i.e., experienced in response to 
relatively minor incidents. Therefore, with these precautions in mind, the following clinical 
implications are indicated.  
First, when not taking into account specific stressor contexts, shame proneness 
prospectively predicted depressed and anxious but not angry moods. Shame-prone individuals 
may be at increased risk for experiencing depressed and anxious moods, which, over time, may 
contribute toward the development of clinical disorders. These associations indicate the necessity 
for implementing interventions to reduce shame if an individual scores highly on the TOSCA-3 
or is observed to respond with shame and related behaviors (e.g., consistent avoidance) that are 
out of proportion to the seriousness of the event. Having a propensity to feel shame under 
circumstances when this emotion is not warranted, or is warranted but at a smaller intensity 
level, is considered maladaptive and, with repeated instances, may contribute towards 
psychopathology. For example, in Linehan’s (2014) Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), 
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emotions that are ineffective for the individual or are out of proportion to the reality and facts of 
the situation are grounds for a skill called “opposite action,” or completing behaviors that are 
opposite to those called by that emotion. Instances of doing so may include self-disclosure 
regarding what the individual is shameful about rather than hiding it, or assuming a confident 
body posture (e.g., head up, shoulders back) as opposed to a shrinking one (e.g., avoiding eye 
contact, slumped shoulders). In fact, research supported short-term effectiveness for an opposite 
action intervention in reducing state shame in BPD for a specific event (Rizvi & Linehan, 2005). 
By persisting in these opposite actions, the individual’s emotions would follow the behavior and 
over time become less shame-prone. Thus, interventions such as this one may be done in order to 
change the emotion, its intensity, and/or to increase the individual’s effectiveness in managing 
the situation.  
Furthermore, frequently feeling shame as described by the self-behavior view, such as by 
evidencing negative internal, stable, and global attributions, may be another clue for providers to 
implement interventions for reducing the individual’s propensity to experience and express 
shame, particularly if there are concerns for depression or anxiety. For example, cognitive 
restructuring in cognitive behavioral therapy may aid in uncovering and challenging the 
attributions to be more in line with the realities of the situation. Alternatively, if an individual is 
already headed towards a trajectory of internalizing disorders, the provider may assess whether 
shame proneness is contributing towards this pathway and intervene accordingly. Therefore, 
shame proneness may be an important consideration when assessing for factors contributing 
toward internalizing psychopathology or if wanting to intervene early to prevent this trajectory 
when observing frequent depressed and anxious moods.  
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Several treatments have been shown to be effective in reducing shame according to a 
systematic review, including CBT, compassion- and mindfulness-based approaches, DBT, and 
trauma-focused therapy (Goffnett et al., 2020). Both individual and group formats produced 
reductions in shame, and changes remained at 2- to 12-month follow-up. Moreover, there were 
reductions in shame even when not the primary aim of the treatment. This review highlighted 
that the aspects of treatment likely accounting for these reductions were cognitive restructuring 
and improved emotion regulation skills. Cognitive reframing was helpful for shame-inducing 
perceptions, social stigma, and traumatic events, while improved emotion regulation followed 
treatments involving mindfulness, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), DBT 
(particularly cognitive reframing and mindfulness components), and interpersonal 
psychotherapy. Despite these effective treatments, the authors pointed out that treatment 
dismantling research is needed to identify the active ingredients for these interventions to further 
specify which type of treatment is effective for which group or situation. This study contributes 
to the literature by beginning to examine which interpersonal contexts are particularly stressful 
for highly shame-prone individuals, thus informing potential routes for treatment.  
On a related note, it is important to recognize the specific if-then situation-behavior 
patterns that place shame-prone individuals at increased risk for distressing moods. Awareness of 
the contexts or interpersonal stressors may help focus and target treatment towards those 
particularly troublesome scenarios. Providers with shame-prone clients who are struggling with 
anger can assess for negative evaluation stressors as these may be contributing to their recurring 
angry moods. Treatment may include coping skills or cognitive restructuring for those perceived 
negative evaluation stressors to decrease the likelihood, frequency, or intensity of anger 
experienced as a result, and instead moving the client towards adaptive emotional and behavioral 
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responses. Taken together, interventions aimed at reducing shame proneness as a general risk 
factor or enhancing the ability to cope with negative evaluation stressors may help to reduce 
angry moods in those with higher shame proneness.  
Limitations and Future Research  
 Several limitations of this study warrant mentioning. First, I did not include statistical 
corrections for conducting multiple tests, although models were consistent with both results of 
data screening (e.g., adding quadratic terms based on scatterplots) and theory-driven effects. 
Second, notable qualifiers for drawing conclusions from this study are the measure of shame 
proneness used and the complexity of the construct definition for shame (beyond the self-
behavior conceptualization). The TOSCA-3 has been the prominent measure of shame proneness 
used in the clinical psychology literature and has shown associations with psychopathology. 
However, the items within the TOSCA-3 limit how shame is portrayed by the items that 
participants may endorse or choose from. If the TOSCA-3 only assesses for negative self-
evaluations associated with shame (and subsequent maladaptive responses) but no prosocial 
emotions or behavior, then participants can only endorse the maladaptive aspects of shame. The 
theory behind the development of the TOSCA-3, which is centered on the self-behavior view, 
captures shame proneness in this manner, which depicts shame as being pathological and 
associated with avoidance. It also captures a dysfunctional aspect of shame where individuals 
may respond with such emotional and behavioral responses in response to relatively benign 
incidents. Not surprisingly, studies conducted using this measure will show associations with 
psychopathology. Indeed, Giner-Sorolla et al. (2011) have criticized that the TOSCA-3 measures 
feelings of shame while capturing only the behaviors of guilt. This limitation with measurement 
is related to a larger issue with disagreement on definitions of shame across disciplines. For 
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example, researchers in the social psychology literature have identified adaptive, prosocial, or 
approach-oriented functions of shame and related behavior (e.g., de Hooge’s sociometer theory), 
resulting in a different perception or view of shame, whereas, as stated above, researchers in the 
clinical psychology literature have primarily portrayed shame as maladaptive (e.g., Tangney’s 
self-behavior view). Differing views on shame will lead to use of different assessment 
instruments based on the researcher’s understanding of shame. Consequently, this will produce 
different results and conclusions regarding shame proneness, further perpetuating a non-unified 
construct and understanding of shame. In their systematic review of shame interventions, 
Goffnett et al. (2020) noted 17 different measures of shame, some contextual and others general, 
with very few studies providing a clear definition of shame. Not surprisingly, they called for an 
operationalization of shame and its construct. In short, results from this study, which uses the 
TOSCA-3 and its associated understanding of shame, may not be generalizable to other contexts 
where shame is understood differently or may show different patterns and associations. Readers 
should be aware, then, that there may be other forms of shame that are less pathological or 
experienced and expressed differently (e.g., via approach behavior) that are not captured by this 
study. Nonetheless, these results are beneficial in understanding how shame proneness, as 
depicted by the TOSCA-3, may prospectively predict distressed moods following interpersonal 
stressors to inform theories of shame. Future studies can use broader measures of shame 
proneness to evaluate these associations and inform theory or our understanding of shame. 
Relatedly, it is possible that the findings of main effects of shame proneness on distressed moods 
may be explained by general poor emotion regulation as opposed to shame-specific effects. 
However, given that shame proneness only predicted depressed and anxious, but not angry, 
moods, this is less likely to be the case. Future studies could aim to better understand the 
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mechanisms of shame or explicitly test whether emotion dysregulation, or more interpersonal 
processes, mediate the relationship between shame proneness and distressed outcomes.  
 A third limitation is the potential for recall bias when retrospectively assessing for moods 
and interpersonal stressors. The use of daily diaries in this study called for participants to 
complete three recordings per week for 5 weeks. Information regarding the stressful interactions 
and associated moods may have been unintentionally altered or forgotten, affecting the 
individual’s interpretation of the event or its outcome thus introducing error. However, emotional 
ratings involving a retrospective design may be more accurate if the mood is linked to a specific 
moment or personal example (Eisenhower et al., 2004), as was used in this study. Future studies 
could decrease the potential for recall bias by having participants complete recordings 
immediately, or within a specified timeframe, following a stressful interaction, reducing this risk.  
 Fourth, although an advantage of this study is the inclusion of participants across 
symptom levels and diagnoses in order to capture a dimensional, transdiagnostic representation 
of risk factors for psychopathology, there are limitations to this approach as well. A minority of 
the sample met criteria for clinical threshold disorder (i.e., approximately 35% and 16% for 
anxiety and depressive disorders, respectively). It is possible that having a higher percentage of 
clinical-level diagnoses, or clinical-only sample, would produce different results. Having a 
sample with a greater severity of symptoms may produce varying results if this sample consisted 
of too few clinical-level symptoms to detect associations with mood or interactions with 
interpersonal stressors. Similarly, these associations may vary according to diagnosis or nature of 
problems experienced. Our sample majority was more characterized by those with social anxiety 
and generalized anxiety disorders, thus potentially limiting generalizability to other diagnoses. 
For example, individuals with internalizing vs. externalizing disorders may show different 
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patterns in their emotional expressions, such that those with externalizing symptoms are more 
likely to experience angry mood whereas those with internalizing disorders may feel depressed 
mood more frequently. Or, moving beyond broad categories of symptoms, individuals with BPD 
may show different patterns of associations compared to individuals with social anxiety disorder. 
On the other hand, these differences may be explained by the internalizing vs. externalizing 
classification. By examining populations with a greater severity of symptoms (i.e., reaching 
clinical threshold), clearer associations and interactions may surface, and researchers could then 
examine whether these relationships hold with subclinical populations. Future studies could 
examine these relationships in clinical vs. non-clinical samples and across disorders. Still, the 
transdiagnostic inclusion of dimensional symptoms is a strength of this study that enhances 
generalizability broadly. 
Conclusion  
 This study offers a novel perspective on how shame proneness may act as a vulnerability 
factor for psychopathology cutting across diagnoses and symptom levels. Few studies in the 
shame literature have used daily diary methods, and this study used situational contexts to assess 
for if-then patterns where individuals with higher shame proneness may be more susceptible to 
reacting towards with distressed moods, thus providing greater specificity in these relationships.  
Additionally, the nature of the study design allowed for examination of how changes in levels 
relative to the individual’s own personal mean may influence distress levels. This study provided 
support for the idea that shame proneness may prospectively act as a general risk factor for 
distressing moods, particularly depression and anxiety, and that there may be certain 
interpersonal stressor instances that shame-prone individuals are more likely to react towards 
with more anger. Further, these findings shed light on theories of shame and its functioning, such 
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that shame proneness may place individuals at increased risk of changes in distressed moods 
when there are particular components activated by that interpersonal stressor (e.g., negative 
evaluation) beyond solely shifts in vertical or horizontal status. More research is needed to 
elucidate shame as a construct, in terms of its theorized function, measurement, and role in 
psychopathology.  
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